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This Article argues that copyright jurisprudence has lost sight
of the knowledge principle at the heart of the constitutional
justification for copyright. The Framers envisioned the objective of
copyright as promoting the advancement of knowledge for a democratic
society by increasing access to published works. Under what is best
termed the "knowledge principle," access to existing knowledge is a
necessary condition for the creation of new knowledge. Copyright
jurisprudence has largely protected the interests of producers-from
early booksellers to modern Hollywood film companies-failing to
notice the central role of access to works as a necessary pre-condition to
the creation of new works. The realities of the digital era further
hinder the functioning of this mechanism. Ownership of copies of texts
has morphed into a limited right of possession of digital files. Public
libraries can no longer fulfill their mission of maximizing the
circulation of materials in order to spread available knowledge among
citizens. This Article proposes an alternative model to the conventional
copyright theories, focusing on the critical role that access to knowledge
resources plays in the dynamic processes at work in the production of
knowledge and the creation of new works. In this model, public
libraries would exercise non-waivable "fair access" rights on behalf of
the public for the purposes of learning and education. These "fair
access" rights serve to realign copyright with its constitutional
justification, and more importantly serve to support the knowledge
creation process for the future of our democratic society.
Visiting Assistant Professor, Drexel University School of Law, J.D., Columbia Law
School. The author wishes to thank Rebecca Tushnet, Terry Jean Seligmann, Pammela Q.
Saunders, and Richard Frankel for their helpful comments. The author is also grateful for the
diligent research assistance of Christina Haines. The author gives special tribute to the late
Professor Benjamin Kaplan whose insightful work inspired the author's modest effort to reflect
on the role of copyright in our twenty-first century digital society.
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I. INTRODUCTION
DATELINE: New York City, December 12, 2050.
Visitors can now see how information used to be published and
circulated to the public at large by viewing the "New York
Public Library Museum" exhibit, which opened today. Public libraries
disappeared after the Great Recession of 2008-2018, as the explosion
in the use of e-readers, like the now antiquated Kindle or Nook, made
sustaining buildings and staff financially untenable in the face
of reduced demand. The project of digitizing all extant print
materials was completed shortly afterwards. In contrast to today's
OogleWorks-managed, cloud-based licensing operation, which rents
40 [Vol. 17:1:39
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time-limited access to digitized works for reading (formerly books),
viewing (movies), or listening (music), the exhibit harkens back to a
time when there was free access to information by members of the
public regardless of means, and when the public itself could own,
share, and circulate information.
This vision of the near future is becoming a reality.' Copyright
jurisprudence has lost sight of what is best termed the "knowledge
principle," which lies at the heart of the constitutional justification for
copyright.2 The Framers envisioned the objective of copyright as
promoting the advancement of knowledge for a democratic society by
increasing access to published works.3 The meaning of "advancement
of knowledge" in this context is of critical importance to a thriving
democratic society and is examined in this Article through the lens of
copyright's knowledge principle. In so doing, this Article reframes
1. See Celeste Bruno, With Demand Growing, Libraries Face Fiscal Pressure, 27 MUN.
ADVOC. 15 (2012), available at http://www.mma.org/resources-mainmenu-182/doc-view/769-with-
demand-growing-libraries-face-fiscal-pressure; Stacey von Winckelmann, The American
Public Library System: A Case Study of Public Libraries in the Twenty-First Century (July 20,
2011) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Leiden University), available at http://www.academia.edu/
4802581/TheAmericanPublicLibrarySystemACaseStudyofPublicLibraries inthe_21st
-Century; Mike Shatzkin, It Will Be Hard To Find A Public Library 15 Years From Now, THE
SHATZKIN FILES BLOG (Apr. 8, 2011, 5:53 PM), http://www.idealog.com/blog/it-will-be-hard-to-
find-a-public-library-15-years-from-now/; The State of America's Libraries: Long-Term Pain
Persists, with Minimal Relief, AM. LIBR. ASS'N, http://www.ala.org/news/mediapresscenter/
americaslibraries/libraryfunding (last visited Dec. 13, 2014). Professor John Tehranian claims
that "[d]igital fences have begun to dot the online landscape, bringing a new enclosure movement
to our cyber commons every bit as significant as the eighteenth-century edition." John
Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, UTAH L. REV. 537,
539 (2007); see also James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 34-37, 40-41 (2003).
2. The copyright power reads, "[tlo promote the Progress of Science ... by securing for
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings . . . ." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "Science" in colonial times referred to knowledge. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT
LAW 32 (3d ed. 2009). In the colonial era, the term "Science" was associated with knowledge,
whereas "the Arts" referred to innovation and patents. Id.; see also Edward Walterscheid, The
Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective, 83 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 763, 781 (2001). The first US copyright statute of 1790 referred to the
"encouragement of learning," following the title of the world's first copyright statute, the Statute
of Anne in Britain in 1710. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§101-1332 (2010)); Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.); see also WILLIAM
PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS xvi-xvii (2009) (referring to Lord Macaulay's
speech about public good being the "bounty of genius and learning" and further characterizing
copyright monopoly as a tax on society whose rate should be justified by an increase in the
bounty of genius and learning); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF
COPYRIGHT 42, 44 (1993) (discussing the priority given to encouragement and learning and
Locke's memo advocating limited terms from monopoly of printing); Isabella Alexander, All
Change for the Digital Economy: Copyright and Business Models in the Early Eighteenth
Century, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1351, 1373 (2010) (discussing Samuel Johnson arguing for
abridgements as not prohibited by the Statute of Anne because they benefit learning and
knowledge); Jessica Litman, Readers'Copyright, 58 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 325, 335 (2011).
3. See supra note 2 and accompanying text,
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copyright theory and jurisprudence to focus on society's interests
rather than producers' interests.4
The knowledge principle holds that access to existing
knowledge is a necessary condition for the creation of new knowledge.5
Even more simply, knowledge must be acquired first before it can be
advanced. For example, a scientist must access the existing
knowledge in her field before she can carry out research to create new
knowledge. The knowledge principle is the fundamental mechanism
by which knowledge is created, produced, and disseminated in society.
Knowledge is held by private and public universities, corporations,
and public libraries.6 Public libraries' mission of promoting access to
knowledge regardless of wealth or status is uniquely aligned with the
values of a democratic society, and thus is the institutional focus of
this inquiry.
Copyright in the digital era diminishes the ability of public
libraries to provide public access to knowledge resources.7 Ownership
of digital copies of texts, still referred to as books, has morphed into
limited rights of possession. This is a sea change from our traditional
conception of information as something which, once acquired in its
published format, can be enjoyed, transferred, or shared.8 Under the
first sale doctrine of copyright, the publisher may not insist upon
permission for further sale or transfer of a book.9 For example, you
might give your purchased copy of the popular novel The Help to your
sister to read after you finish it. A few weeks later, she includes it
with some other books in a neighborhood garage sale. In this
example, at least three persons will have enjoyed the opportunity to
read the novel. Over time, this number could increase many times
4. The Framers saw the creation and dissemination of copyrighted material as the
method to accomplish copyright's end-the "advancement of knowledge" for society, not for
authors or publishers. Jessica Litman notes, "Congress, for its part, once took some care to paint
its copyright laws as designed to benefit the public rather than the authors and publishers who
would enjoy the profits flowing from the temporary copyright monopoly." Litman, supra note 2,
at 327; see also infra Part IV.A.
5. ZOHAR EFRONI, ACCESS-RIGHT: THE FUTURE OF DIGITAL COPYRIGHT LAW 7 (2011)
("We acquire knowledge through experiencing and experimenting as well as by observing and
learning from others.").
6. See FRITZ MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1962).
7. This refers to the embodiment of copyrighted material in digital rather than print
form. See David Vinjamuri, Why Public Libraries Matter: And How They Can Do More, FORBES
(Jan. 16, 2013, 3:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidvinjamuril2013/01/16/why-public-
libraries-matter-and-how-they-can-do-more/2/ (describing the current "technology trap" in which
publishers require libraries to purchase a "license made to resemble a book purchase," the
restrictions on which threaten to limit the abilities of libraries to provide for future patrons).
8. The owner of a copy of a print book is free to use it as they wish. See Bobbs-Merrill
Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
9. See id.
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over, limited only by the inevitable decay of the material comprising
the book. Through public libraries, many people have the use of the
same physical book.
Digital copies of the same book are treated differently. First,
you need an e-reader, like a Nook or a Kindle, to be able to purchase a
digital copy of The Help. Then, an end-user license agreement
contains certain restrictions on that purchase so that you do not have
the same access privileges that you have with the print version.10 For
example, you may only read the digital copy on your e-reader, and you
generally cannot transfer the copy to anyone else." If you want to sell
the Nook to another person, you may not transfer your collection of
books to that person; rather, they must purchase their own collection
of books from Barnes and Noble.12 In the digital era, the first sale
doctrine has disappeared.13
Why is this scenario a problem for society? The social value of
copyright is the promise of the advancement of knowledge and the
encouragement of learning in order to support a thriving democratic
society.1 4  Copyright's original rationale was-and continues to
be-aligned with the values of a democratic society, namely social
mobility, civic participation, and economic productivity, all of which
rely on vibrant, robust knowledge systems.15 In the near future,
10. See Amazon Kindle Terms of Use, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/
help/customer/display.html/ref=hpjeftsib/178-4801626-6304458?ie=UTF8&nodeld=200506200
(last updated Sept. 17, 2014); Nook Terms of Service, BARNES & NOBLE,
http://www.barnesandnoble.com/u/Terms-of-Service-NOOK-Simple-Touch/379003279/ (last
visited Dec. 13, 2014).
11. Amazon Kindle Terms of Use, supra note 10; Nook Terms of Service, supra note 10.
12. Nook Terms of Service, supra note 10. There have been reports that Barnes & Noble
may sell its business, raising other questions about the digital rights in the books purchased by
its customers. See Julie Bosman, Fork in the Road for Barnes & Noble,
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/business/fork-in-the-road-for-a-
bookseller.html?r=0.
13. HarperCollins informed its library customers that they no longer had the right to
unlimited checkouts for the digital text. Josh Hadro, HarperCollins Puts 26 Loan Cap on Ebook
Circulation, LIBR. J. (Feb. 25, 2011), http://lj.libraryjournal.com/2011/02/technologylebooks/
harpercollins-puts- 26-loan-cap-on-ebook-circulations/. Each purchase would be limited to twenty-
six checkouts, then expire. See id.; see also SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND
COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 175
(2001).
14. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 74-76 (1967).
15. See, e.g., Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining "Progress"
in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress
Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 785 (2001); Martin Dewhurst, Bryan Hancock & Diana Ellsworth,
Redesigning Knowledge Work, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 2013), available at
http://hbr.org/2013/01/redesigning-knowledge-work/ar/1 (noting that in the modern knowledge
economy, "competitive advantage is increasingly coming from the particular, hard-to-duplicate
know-how of a company's most skilled people" and observing that some firms are investing in
training and apprenticeship programs, while others are redefining jobs to spread tasks from
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digital content will be, by and large, the only kind of content
available.16 If current doctrinal trends continue, the restrictions on
access to digital content will result in less accessibility to knowledge
resources than in the print era. The disappearance of the first sale
doctrine in the digital era greatly impacts the mission of public
libraries to maximize the circulation of materials in order to spread
the availability of knowledge among citizens.'7
Publishers may impose downstream limitations on usage of
digital copies of text.'8 Publishers are not required to license digital
content to public libraries, and a large percentage of publishers have
refused to do so.19 Moreover, publishers have begun to attach
"checkout restrictions" on digital material.20 Once patrons check out a
copy of a digital book a limited number of times, the library must then
experts to other employees); Marco R. della Cava, Retrain Your Brain from "Left" to "Right" to Fit
into New Economy, USA TODAY (July 14, 2009, 10:35 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/life/
lifestyle/2009-07-13-right-vs-left-brains-n.htm (observing that economic recovery is contingent
on "right brain" innovations and creativity); Jeanne Meister, Job Hopping Is the "New Normal"
for Millennials: Three Ways to Prevent a Human Resource Nightmare, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2012,
8:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeannemeister/2012/08/14/job-hopping-is-the-new-normal-
for-millennials-three-ways-to-prevent-a-human-resource-nightmare/ (noting that millennials can
expect to have fifteen to twenty jobs over the course of their working lives and addressing
challenges for employers investing in job-hopping employees).
16. There is significant information available on the internet for "free" (as long as you
have an internet connection). Much of the information freely available is marketing material
intended to induce purchases of goods and services, as well as opinion-related information for
advocacy purposes. This information is useful for markets and free speech but does not advance
learning or promote progress as defined in this Article. The value of that information is proven
by the fact that it is protected by copyright, and often found on the internet behind pay walls. As
further evidence that the valuable information is not freely available on the Internet, Google
spent millions of dollars to digitize information on the Internet. Finally, libraries would not have
spent time and resources battling for more access to information if it was freely available on the
Internet. See infra notes 323, 372. It is also important to remember that librarians serve an
important role as curators of that information.
17. AM. LIBRARY ASS'N, E-CONTENT: THE DIGITAL DIALOGUE (2012); Mission &
Priorities, AM. LIBR. ASs'N, www.ala.org/aboutala/missionpriorities (last visited Dec. 13, 2014)
(stating that the mission of the American Library Association is "to enhance learning and ensure
access to information for all"). ALA President Molly Raphael notes that as more content is
delivered digitally, fair and reasonable access to digital information is threatened by the
publishers' practices of locking down books and locking out readers. Mission & Priorities, AM.
LIBR. ASS'N, www.ala.org/aboutala/missionpriorities (last visited Dec. 13, 2014).
18. The digital copy will be accompanied by digital locks, licensing restrictions, and the
force of the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
(DMCA). Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860.
19. Barbara Stripling et al., ALA, Future of Libraries, Digital Content, and Ebooks, AM.
LIBRS. MAG. (June 12, 2013, 9:59 AM), http://www.americanlibrariesmagazine.org/article/ala-
future-libraries-digital-content-and-ebooks; Message from the Director: Digital Demand Drives
Change at Your Library, CINCINNATI LIBR., http://www.cincinnatilibrary.org/news/
2013/directormessagewinter.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2014).
20. Hadro, supra note 13.
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purchase another digital copy. 21 It is not difficult to see that the
volume of material that a library can afford to purchase (if even made
available by publishers) will decrease in the digital era.
Copyright commentary has failed to notice the central
importance of access to works-all works-as a necessary
pre-condition to the creation of new works.22 The scholarly literature
has discussed at great length authorship and the production of
copyrighted works.23 There has been no serious discussion, however,
about the specific processes necessary to produce knowledge.24
Copyright jurisprudence has conflated the creation function with the
distribution function, and has neglected to understand the knowledge
principle of copyright entirely.2 5 In so doing, it lost sight of its original
justification, confusing means (authors' and publishers' interests) with
ends (society's interest in the advancement of knowledge).
This Article also reframes the conventional copyright debate
from one of rights versus utilitarian theory, to one of pro-expansion
versus pro-restraint of copyright's distribution right. Copyright
jurisprudence and modern copyright theory are best understood as
rationalizing the competing economic interests of expansion versus
21. Art Brodsky, The Abomination of Ebooks: They Price People Out of Reading,
WIRED, (Oct. 2, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/10/how-ebook-pricing-hurts-us-in-
more-ways-than-you-think/; Adam Vaccaro, Why It's Difficult for Your Library to Lend Ebooks,
BOSTON.COM (June 27, 2014, 10:26 AM), http://www.boston.com/business/technology/
2014/06/27/why-difficult-for-your-library-stock-ebooks/rrl464TPxDaYmDnJewOmzH/story.html.
22. The scholarly commentary focuses on the fair use doctrine; however, fair use does
not provide access to all of the work. It is a doctrine developed in the nineteenth century to
provide some space for follow-on producers to distribute content that reused some portion of an
earlier published work. See infra notes 350-56 and accompanying text. Michael Madison notes
that fair use jurisprudence has evolved in a way that makes it even more challenging for
purposes of education and learning: "[Clourts perform legal contortions to persuade themselves
that verbatim reproductions of copyrighted works are transformative." Michael Madison, Beyond
Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 830 (2010).
23. Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship, 2
DUKE L.J. 455 (1991).
24. A few scholars have questioned the lack of inquiry into the creative processes
associated with copyright. This Article, however, focuses not on creativity as the process
underlying copyright, but knowledge production. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture
in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1152-54 (2007); Gregory N. Mandel, To
Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999 (2011); Jessica Silbey, Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired
Beginnings and "Work-Makes- Work," Two Stages in the Creative Processes of Artists and
Innovators, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2091 (2011); Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of
Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319 (2008).
25. The Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft assumed the linkage between "the
incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights" and the "public benefit ... resulting in the
proliferation of knowledge." 537 U.S. 186, 269 n. 18 (2003) (internal citation omitted).
Litman notes that there is little legal scholarship about how the works created and distributed in
the copyright ecosystem are used by the public. Litman, supra note 2, at 339.
2014] 45
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restraint in the distribution of copyrighted works.26  Both of the
dominant doctrinal camps-pro -restraint and pro-expansion-neglect
the critical role that access to existing knowledge plays in the creation
of new knowledge, and most importantly, to the advancement of
knowledge in society.27
Pro-restraint scholars have criticized the expansion of
copyright for the past two decades.28 They have argued that the fair
use doctrine needs to be retrofitted for the digital era.29 Fair use
means that a portion of a work may be reused without authorization of
the copyright holder. By definition, fair use is not consistent with the
knowledge principle, which requires access to all of the relevant
material.30 Also, there is no ex ante certainty for the user. Each case
is decided on its particular facts, so a great deal of litigation is
necessary to rely on the doctrine.31 For example, licensing restrictions
prohibit a library from making digital materials available for its users
after a fixed number of checkouts.32 Fair use would not shield a
library that violated those restrictions in order to make a digital copy
of a college preparatory manual available to an economically
disadvantaged urban high school student.
Pro-expansion scholars contend that the idea-expression
doctrine in copyright adequately protects the value of new creation.33
The idea-expression doctrine means that a subsequent creator can use
26. See infra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
27. See infra Part IV.A. This Article reframes the dominant narrative of copyright, as
grounded in either rights or utilitarian theory. The theoretical bases debated in contemporary
copyright are not found at the time of the creation of copyright in late seventeenth and early
eighteenth century England. The historical context of copyright reveals the underlying rationale
for copyright as one of restraint on concentration of economic power-the struggle between
London booksellers and the British Parliament in the late seventeenth century. This restraint-
expansion tension continues through the history of copyright jurisprudence.
28. See Glynn S. Lunney, The Death of Copyright, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001);
Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 486-87 (2004); Edward
C. Walterscheid, Musing on the Copyright Power: A Critique of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 14 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 309 (2004).
29. See Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOzO L.
REV. 55, 82-83 (2001); PATRY, supra note 2, at xxiv, vxv, 125-28; Jaszi, supra note 23, at 455;
Litman, supra note 2, at 343-44.
30. Parody represents the exception to the partial amount rule. See Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 596 (1994); Rebecca Tushnet, My Library: Copyright and the Role
of Institutions in a Peer-to-Peer World, 53 UCLA L. REV. 977, 983 (2006).
31. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY TO LOCK
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 185, 187 (Penguin 2004). Lawrence Lessig famously
said that "fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to defend your right to
create." Id. at 187; see also Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright's Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI.
L. REV. 331, 350-52 (2012) (explaining why the fair use doctrine is plagued with uncertainty).
32. Hadro, supra note 13.
33. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 14-15 (Stanford Univ. Press rev. ed. 2003).
46 [Vol. 17:1:39
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the ideas in the copyrighted material, just not the particular
expression of the ideas contained in the material.34 The
methodological problem with this doctrine is that no one knows what
is on the "idea" side (unprotected) versus the "expression" side
(protected) until there has been litigation. More importantly, this
doctrine does not address the importance of access to the work in the
first place (both the ideas and the expression). As discussed below,
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), passed in 1998,35
empowers content producers to enforce digital locks that they install
on their content.36 Under current law, users cannot break those locks,
even for purposes of the fair use doctrine or the idea-expression
doctrine.37 Both doctrinal camps neglect he critical role of access to
existing knowledge as a pre-condition to the creation of new
knowledge.
This Article proposes an alternative model to the conventional
copyright theories, focusing on the critical role that access to
knowledge resources plays in the dynamic processes at work in the
production of knowledge and the creation of new works. In this model,
public libraries would exercise non-waivable "fair access" rights on
behalf of the public for the purposes of learning and education. This
Article will show that these "fair access" rights foster a healthy,
vibrant knowledge creation process, thus promoting the democratic
values underlying copyright's justification.38 Access to knowledge is
not only consistent with democratic values, it underlies copyright's
constitutional justification, namely the "progress," or advancement, of
its citizens.
Part II of this Article claims that copyright is justified by
society's interest in the advancement of knowledge and learning. The
historical context of copyright, its birth story in Britain, then its
adoption by the fledgling United States, demonstrate the
34. 1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03 (2014).
35. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860.
36. See infra notes 317-21 and accompanying text. Siva Vaidhyanathan notes that the
Clinton Administration's report titled Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, referred to as
the "White Paper," published in 1995, which served as the blueprint for the DMCA, referred to
fair use as a "tax" on owners of copyrighted material. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 13, at 159.
37. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012) (generally
referred to as the "anti-circumvention provisions" of the Act).
38. A recent article about rising inequality in the United States, especially compared
with other industrialized countries, notes that "[i]n a globalized, high-tech world in which
education has become the central determinant of economic success, it is hardly surprising that
the prosperity of American children is more dependent on the prosperity of their parents than
that of children in most other advanced countries." See Eduardo Porter, Inequality in America:
The Data is Sobering, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/business/
economy/in-us-an-inequality-gap-of-sobering-breadth.html?_r=0.
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policymakers' concern with the societal effects stemming from the
monopoly privilege exercised by the book publishers in the
distribution of books, referred to at the time as "monopolies of
knowledge."39  Those policymakers created a private means to
incentivize the distribution of books in order to achieve the public
good-namely, the advancement of knowledge and learning.
Part III explains how copyright jurisprudence-print to
digital-is best understood as rationalizing the competing economic
interests associated with the distribution of copyrighted works. As
copyright became associated with the goal of maximizing the dollar
value of the commodities benefiting from its protection, it became
disconnected from its original justification-the advancement of
knowledge-as judges and commentators alike confused the means of
copyright with its end.
Part IV begins with the conventional accounts of copyright,
which fail to sufficiently understand the critical role that access to
knowledge resources plays in the creation function of copyright. The
semantic expansion of copyright from book production to cultural
production, and the concomitant emphasis on the dollar value of
copyrighted commodities, has distracted scholars from the focus of
copyright's effect on the advancement of knowledge in society.40
Finally, a theory is suggested that recognizes the dynamic character of
the knowledge production process, incorporating the principle that the
creation of new knowledge relies on access to existing knowledge. In
this model, public libraries would exercise non-waivable "fair access"
rights on behalf of the public for the purposes of learning and
education.
II. KNOWLEDGE
The birth story of copyright in England and the republic of the
United States share an important attribute-struggle against
concentration of power by the British Crown.41 In 1695, the British
Lords eliminated the Crown's monopoly in publishing as "injurious to
learning," and in 1709 established the world's first copyright act with
the objective of "the encouragement of learning."42  Nearly one
39. ROSE, supra note 2, at 32.
40. Cf. Madison, supra note 22, at 828-29.
41. Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright's Derivative
Work Right, 101 GEO. L. J. 1505, 1506-08 (2013). In democracies, knowledge flourishes; in
authoritarian regimes, it is constrained. Id. In the late 1600s, the British House of Lords was
struggling with the Crown for sharing of political power; the US forefathers had fought a war for
independence from the British Crown. Id.
42. ROSE, supra note 2, at 33, 36, 46.
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hundred years later, the US colonies fought for independence and the
right to establish an independent republic founded on democratic
values.43 For their time it was progressive, if not radical, to propose
greater liberty and participation for (some of) its citizens in their
social, political, and economic lives. 44
The right to participate in the realms of the social, political,
and economic life of society is meaningless without access to
knowledge.45 In the print era, the constraint on society's access to
knowledge has been the distribution of books. As the British Lords
recognized in their seventeenth-century struggle with the Crown,
publishers needed an incentive to invest in the uncertain market of
books.46  In the early days of the US republic, advancement of
knowledge was recognized as the means for fostering political and
economic participation of the individual citizen, and at the same time
furthering the prosperity of the nation. Our modern democratic society
has been defined by its ability to offer citizens the opportunity for
social mobility, civic participation, and economic productivity, all of
which rely on robust knowledge systems.47
A. Copyright's Public Good
This Article asserts that the advancement of knowledge in our
democratic society is the public good that justifies copyright.48 The
original US copyright statute limited the subject matter to maps,
charts, and books, all of which supported the goals of education and
43. See Richard Schneirov & Gaston A. Fernandez, DEMOCRACY AS A WAY OF LIFE IN
AMERICA: A HISTORY 13 (Routledge 2014).
44. See id. at 11.
45. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, JEFFERSON VS. THE PATENT TROLLS: A POPULIST
VISION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 37 (Univ. of Virginia Press 2008) ("For Jefferson, a
cornerstone of an effective democracy was the ability to disseminate knowledge and information
widely among its citizens.").
46. See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 46 (Vanderbilt
Univ. Press 1968) ("[The basic essential to publishing was the stationer's copyright, which
protected the publisher in getting a return on his capital investment. Without this, any
arrangement for publishing would have been too risky a venture.").
47. Stephen Colbran & Anthony Gilding, MOOC's and the Rise of Online Legal
Education, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 405, 405 (2014) ("[Tlhe capacity to create and apply knowledge
defines the post-industrial digital economy. . . . [Slustainable prosperity depends on a society's
capacity to create and apply knowledge to solve problems.").
48. See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 2, at 32; EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 125-26 (2002);
Litman, supra note 2, at 328 (citing NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 485 (2d Cir. 2004)
(mentioning the "benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors," but failing to specify
what those benefits are); Samuelson, supra note 41.
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advancement of knowledge.49  As discussed below, copyright
jurisprudence, as well as Congressional action, has broadened both
the scope of the right and the subject matter of copyright to include
photography, music, film, and even software.50 By the twentieth
century, copyright policy had become characterized by a concern for
cultural production reflecting the broader scope of protection afforded
to copyrighted goods in the private market.51
Copyright accounts generally begin with the uncritical
(unchallenged) assumption of the linkage between copyright policy on
the one hand, and creativity and cultural production on the other.52
Scholars often assert that copyright's purpose is to promote creativity
and production of cultural goods, without looking closely at the
constitutional language at work.53  A closer examination of the
Copyright Clause, however, reveals the intent to promote the progress
of knowledge (in colonial times, "science" meant "knowledge").54 There
is no reference to the broader scope of culture or creativity. It has
been imputed.55 Books are associated with learning; the expansion of
subject matter of copyright over the past two hundred years to include
film, music, visual arts, and more, led courts and scholars to
uncritically broaden the term.5 6 Scholars have largely neglected to
49. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat 124, 124 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§101-1332 (2010)). See generally L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40
VAND L. REV. 1, 7 (1987).
50. See infra Part III.
51. See Litman, supra note 2, at 325 (stating that copyright "confer[s] strong,
enforceable, assignable rights on creators and the entities that make investments in their
work."). Supreme Court jurisprudence has reiterated the public interest served by the granting
of certain private rights in the writings of authors. Id. at 336; see also Paul Goldstein, Derivative
Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 209, 215-16 (1983).
52. See Cohen, supra note 24, at 1151 ("Creativity is universally agreed to be a good
that copyright law should seek to promote . . . ."). Cohen refers to the "cultural production of
knowledge," but her article does not focus on knowledge as an input or output of the copyright
system, but rather the broader inquiry of cultural production encompassing all of the subject
matter of contemporary copyright. Id. at 1164. Cf. Madison, supra note 22, at 824 (arguing that
the "concept of knowledge should be rehabilitated as an anchor for copyright" rather than
creativity).
53. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 22, at 824, 827; Samuelson, supra note 41, at 1506-
08.
54. See sources cited supra notes 2, 53.
55. See Madison, supra note 22, at 824. In response to a question of how did copyright
become a law of creativity, Madison responded, "[An ideology of creative authorship that
developed among nineteenth-century critics who advocated for expanded legal protection for
authors." Id. at 828-29. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment is an Information Policy, 41
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (2012).
56. See IP Myths v. Facts, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROP. CENTER (Jan. 5, 2010),
http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/ip-myths-v-facts. In the report, the Global Intellectual
Property Center, a part of the US Chamber of Commerce, claims that stronger intellectual
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analyze the implications of this semantic expansion for the societal
objectives of copyright.5 7
This Article focuses its inquiry narrowly on books-also
referred to herein as "works of knowledge"-and the dynamic
processes at work between copyright and its original intent:
encouragement of learning and the advancement of knowledge. This
Article contends that this process is dynamic and contingent, rather
than static and transcendent.5 8 These dynamic processes comprise
"the knowledge production process," which is a cyclical process.5 9
Knowledge resources (existing knowledge) form the inputs of the
processes of learning and the creation of new knowledge.60 New
knowledge constitutes an output of the knowledge-production process,
then an input back into the processes of learning and creation of new
knowledge, and so on.6 1 Those who become educated by the knowledge
production process are able to then contribute to the same process.62
They are learners and creators. Just like the education of our
children, or the proof of a scientific method, access to knowledge
supports the pursuit of education and knowledge, as well as the
knowledge production process itself. The progress of knowledge occurs
through the discovery and sharing of existing knowledge, referred to
herein as "knowledge resources." The pool of knowledge resources
accessible to all citizens, regardless of wealth or status, for the
purposes of learning and education is referred to herein as the
"intellectual commons" of the knowledge ecosystem.
A healthy knowledge ecosystem supports the creation and
dissemination of knowledge necessary for the progress of further
knowledge. It includes the knowledge infrastructure, but also refers
property rights promote innovation and creativity whereas weaker rights will threaten the same.
Id. No empirical support is provided. Id.; see also Madison, supra note 22, at 828-29.
57. Scholars have focused on the creativity narrative, which maps to the expansion of
copyright's subject matter from books and learning to music, plays, film, and even software. See,
e.g., Cohen, supra note 24, at 1151 ("Creativity is universally agreed to be a good that copyright
law should seek to promote . . . ."); Horowitz, supra note 31, at 333 (claiming that the goal of
copyright is to promote expressive works).
58. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw & Social Change: A Democratic Approach to
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 243 (1996); infra Part IV.B; see
also Cohen, supra note 24, at 1179.
59. See infra Part TV.B.
60. In the education system, this is represented by textbooks and other sources of
knowledge that are used to teach students about existing knowledge. The open access movement
is predicated on the notion that access to knowledge is necessary to become educated and
contribute to new knowledge. In 2003, the Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in
Sciences and Humanities was signed. As of 2013, 451 organizations have signed the statement.
Berlin Conference, OPEN ACCESS, http://openaccess.mpg.de/Berlin-Declaration (last visited Dec.
13, 2014).
61. Id.
62. See Cohen, supra note 24, at 1166-67.
2014]1 51
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
to the dynamic processes of knowledge production. Knowledge
production processes occur as knowledge resources are created and
distributed in the spatial context of the individuals within the
knowledge institutions.63 Creation of knowledge occurs through
learning first, creation second.64 Knowledge production relies on the
feedback loop of creation and distribution of works of knowledge.
Copyright theory has treated the production function as exogenous, or
in the words of one scholar, "transcendent and absolute."65  In
contrast, this Article claims that the knowledge production process is
tangible and concrete. If society thought the process of educating our
children was beyond comprehension, or extending beyond the limits of
ordinary experience,66 society would not invest enormous sums in
resources, such as teachers and books.67 Common sense dictates that
if you want a child to learn, you need to give him or her access to
materials that will aid the education process.
The scientific method illustrates the relationship between the
scientist and knowledge.68 A scientist does not assume a principle
works unless it has been tested and supported by empirical data. For
example, a scientist working at a university research center accesses
the knowledge resources contained in the knowledge ecosystem by
interactions with his or her colleagues at the center, as well as the
myriad of other institutions that the university collaborates with.
When the scientist learns about a colleague's discovery at another
institution, then goes back to her laboratory and begins a new
experiment, which leads to her own discovery, the knowledge
production process is functioning. The knowledge principle represents
63. See id. at 1176-77.
64. As part of the effort to make knowledge universally available, the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has spearheaded an effort to
encourage institutions of higher education to make their courses available online. See, e.g., Open
Educational Resources, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-
information/access-to-knowledge/open-educational-resources/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2014). MIT
has done so since 2001. See MIT To Make Nearly All Course Materials Available Free on the
World Wide Web, MIT NEWS (Apr. 4, 2001), http://newsoffice.mit.edul2001/ocw.
65. Cohen, supra note 24, at 1165; see also Jessica Litman, Public Domain, 39 EMORY
L.J. 965, 1023 (1990) ("The vision of authorship on which it is based-portraying authorship as
ineffable creation from nothing-is both flawed and misleading, disserving the authors it seeks
to extol.").
66. The Merriam-Webster dictionary definition of "transcendent" is "exceeding usual
limits; extending or lying beyond the limits of ordinary experience; being beyond
comprehension." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2009).
67. In 2008-2009, total spending by school districts was approximately $610.1 billion.
See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., NCES, 2012-001, DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS, tbl. 191, ch. 2.
68. JACOB BROWNOWSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 202 (1973). Galileo was the creator of the
modern scientific method. Id. He designed experiments to test his hypothesis, then published the
results so that his colleagues could test and attempt to refute the results. Id.
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this process as it maximizes access to knowledge resources. Scholars
have not examined or explained the effect of copyright jurisprudence
on this process. This blind spot carries over to copyright
jurisprudence, where doctrines developed without an understanding of
how they affected the learning and creation function of copyright. As
discussed below, these doctrines, properly understood, really concern
the distribution function of copyright.
"Access" as used herein has a very expansive meaning. It is
concerned with the quality and quantity of access as a three
dimensional subject. Access is about control over the work by the
user. Here, the focus is not on the alienation of the work, but what
the possessor of the work can do with it while the work is in her
possession. In the case of a book, it is about the control over decisions
regarding the time and place to read the book. That control allows the
reader the freedom to choose the optimal conditions for absorbing and
understanding the contents of the book that will fulfill her personal
objectives in obtaining the book in the first place. In the case of
education and research, it is easy to understand why more freedom in
the selection of time and place for the reader (as student or
researcher) will positively affect that reader's ability to succeed as a
student or scholar.69 The reader may want to benefit from reading the
book aloud to other students or researchers to benefit from their
reactions and understanding of the material. They may need
additional time to take notes on the material to aid in the
understanding of the material.
In society, knowledge is held by institutions, including
universities (public and private), corporations (for profit and
nonprofit), and public libraries.70 Collectively, these institutions are
referred to as the "knowledge infrastructure."7 1 These institutions can
be distinguished for purposes of the knowledge production process by
varying incentive structures and general missions of purpose toward
the sharing of knowledge.72 Public libraries represent the single
69. See Cohen, supra note 24, at 1180, 1194. Cohen critiques contemporary theory that
presumes access to extant cultural resources regardless of their location in space and time. Id.
She emphasizes assessing copyright to the extent that it renders inputs to the creative process
available to creators. Id.
70. Although individuals also hold knowledge, knowledge is most concentrated (and
circulated) within institutions. See FRITZ MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF
KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1962).
71. This is the author's definition.
72. On two ends of the spectrum are the public libraries and corporations; the former
existing solely for the spread of knowledge in society, and the latter focused on the interests of its
shareholders or board. For the profit-making corporation, there will likely be an inverse
relationship between the sharing of its proprietary knowledge and its profit-making goals. In
between those two institutions lie academic institutions. Traditionally their mission has been the
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institution dedicated to the sharing of knowledge without regard to
affiliation or economic means.73
Public libraries have warned that trends in copyright would
reduce access to information and increase the digital divide among
income classes.74 Libraries understood the implications of this trend
toward limited rights of possession on access to knowledge,
particularly for the less advantaged members of society.75 Libraries
focused on the objectives of copyright to encourage learning and their
mission to provide access to knowledge as widely as possible.76 For
public libraries, access is about the broad circulation of materials
among patrons, including the right to lend materials to other libraries
(increasing circulation) and to archive materials (protecting access for
posterity). Libraries attempted to counter the shift toward reduced
access by compelling producers to permit more use of the digital
works, on par with pre-digital use.77 However, they failed.78 They did
not have the right model or strategy.79 Their solution had little hope
advancement of knowledge, but this may be in conflict with a trend toward monetizing its
research.
73. Universities require special affiliation to access their knowledge resources, for
example, credentials as a professor or a student at the particular institution. There are network
effects of this affiliation, as typically universities have agreements where resources may be
shared between them. Corporations are ven less transparent. Their competitiveness often relies
on the secrecy of their knowledge resources. They are unlikely to enter into sharing agreements
or make their resources available to the public. Public libraries, on the contrary, have had the
mission to make knowledge resources available as widely as possible.
74. See, e.g., New ALA Report Explores Challenges of Equitable Access to Digital
Content, AM. LIBR.. ASS'N (May 23, 2012), http://www.ala.org/news/press-releases/2012/05/new-
ala-report-explores-challenges-equitable-access-digital-content; Nancy Kranich, President, Am.
Library Ass'n, Midwinter Meeting Address: The Digital Divide & Information Equity: Challenges
& Opportunities for Libraries in the Twenty-First Century, available at http://www.ala.org/
aboutala/governance/officers/past/kranichlmw2001.
75. See Kranich, supra note 74.
76. See, e.g., ANNE K. BEAUBIEN, ARL WHITE PAPER ON INTERLIBRARY LOAN (2007),
available at http://www.arl.org/storage/documents/publications/arl white-paper-ill-june07.pdf;
Strategic Plan: 2011-2015, AM. LIBR. ASS'N, http://www.ala.org/aboutala/sites/ala.org.aboutala/
files/content/missionhistory/plan/strategic%20plan%202015%20documents/strategic-plan_2.pdf
(last visited Dec. 13, 2014).
77. See infra note 323 (discussing the Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies).
78. See id.
79. Libraries have relied on the traditional arguments that a liberal fair use doctrine
will solve the problems of access in the digital era. As discussed in Part IV.A, the fair use
doctrine and public domain concept do not support access to all the material, and have the
methodological problem of being decided after the use has occurred. See, e.g., Principles &
Strategies for the Reform of Scholarly Communication 1, ASS'N C. & RES. LIBRS.,
http://www.ala.org/acrl/publications/whitepapers/principlesstrategies (last visited Dec. 13, 2014)
(observing in 2003 that "powerful commercial interests have successfully supported-and are
continuing to advocate-changes in copyright law that limit the public domain and significantly
reduce principles of fair use, particularly for information in digital form").
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of adoption. They failed to understand that copyright jurisprudence
was misaligned with those objectives. They relied on conventional
copyright theory where creation of the copyrighted work has not been
a central concern; and thus, access to copyrighted works is poorly
understood as a mechanism in the creation function of copyrighted
works.80 As a result, society faces the prospect of a significant decline
in the availability of knowledge resources as the shift from print to
digital dissemination of copyrighted content is completed.81
To understand how this misalignment occurred, it is necessary
to travel back in time to the pre-copyright era of seventeenth-century
England. The birth story of copyright in England, and subsequently
the United States, explains the lack of attention to the creation
function of copyright. Copyright first appeared in 1710 as the Statute
of Anne in Britain.82  Its aim was never to solve a creation
problem-i.e., the writing of books-or in modern copyright erms, the
"authorship of works."8 3  Statutory copyright was a political
compromise for the British book publishers (mostly London
booksellers) that had enjoyed an absolute monopoly on the publishing
and distribution of books for nearly 150 years.84 This monopoly had
derived not from parliamentary power, but royal power.85  The
political regime of the Licensing Act and the economic regime of
statutory copyright were about the question of copying and
distributing books.86
B. Anglo-American Copyright's Birth Story
Britain's Statute of Anne established the world's first copyright
statute in 1710.87 The statute proclaimed its objective in its title: "An
80. Cf. Carol C. Henderson, Libraries as Creatures of Copyright, AM. LIBR. ASS'N,
http://www.ala.org/advocacy/copyright/copyrightarticlellibrariescreatures (last visited Aug. 21,
2013) ("What librarians seek as copyright law and related rules are being reshaped for the
digital age is to maintain for users, and for libraries and educational institutions acting on their
behalf, their rights to at least the same extent as they have enjoyed them in the analog
environment.").
81. See Vinjamuri, supra note 7.
82. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.).
83. Craig Joyce, L. Ray Patterson: Copyright (and Its Master) in Historical Perspective,
10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 239, 244 (2003) (citing L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair
Use, 40 VAND L. REV. 1, 607 (1987)); KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 75.
84. ROSE, supra note 2, at 43, 47.
85. Id. at 12. Starting with Henry VIII the royals were concerned with the adverse
effects of rogue, dissenting publications and worked with a special club of booksellers
(publishers) to censure texts. Id.
86. Joyce, supra note 83, at 242, 244.
87. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.).
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Act for the Encouragement of Learning."88 The United States followed
the British model, adopting a nearly mirror-image statute in 1790.89
US copyright, however, is also derived from a direct constitutional
power found in Article I, Section 8.90
By the late 1600s, the House of Lords was pressing the Crown
to share political and economic power.91 The Crown had established a
large number of economic monopolies as a method of revenue
collection.92  A growing faction of the House of Lords became
concerned about the anti-competitive effects of these monopolies,
including the printing of books.93 A special club of printers belonging
to the Stationers' Guild had enjoyed the exclusive right to print
books.94 They had enjoyed this privilege (in one form or another) for
nearly 150 years.95 The Guild had perpetual rights in the books they
published.96 Authors had neither statutory nor common-law rights.97
They were usually paid a one-time fee, like any other commodity, and
then the publisher enjoyed a perpetual monopoly on the publishing
rights of the manuscript.98
During this period, Parliament began wresting control of these
monopolies from the Crown.99 Initially, Parliament had agreed to
maintain the printing monopoly through a renewable Licensing Act.100
The printers had to return to Parliament periodically for its renewal,
but they essentially continued to have perpetual rights in the books
they published and could exclude any non-member of the Guild from
publishing any book.10 John Locke had campaigned against renewal
88. Id.
89. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§101-
1332 (2012)).
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
91. PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 34-35 (2002).
92. Id.
93. ROSE, supra note 2, at 32; Joyce, supra note 83, at 242-43.
94. ROSE, supra note 2, at 31-32.
95. Id. at 43. The printing press dates back to the Gutenberg press in 1440. Id. It
arrived in Britain shortly thereafter. Id. Across Europe and England, royal authorities and papal
authorities became concerned about the potential (and real) threat of an uncontrolled press as
the voice of dissent. Id. So, they moved to control its use first by imposing censure regulations,
then in England, the Crown found it more efficient to censure through the economic monopoly of
the Stationers' Guild. Id.
96. Id. at 24.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 44.
99. Id. at 33-34.




of the Licensing Act in the late 1600s.102 Writing to his friend and
Member of Parliament, Edward Clarke, Locke expressed his concern
over the monopoly power exercised by the Stationers' Guild over the
ancient author, and argued that it was "very unreasonable and
injurious to learning."103
In 1695, the House of Lords blocked renewal of the Licensing
Act. 104 They reported that it "subjects all Learning and true
Information to the arbitrary Will and Pleasure of a mercenary and
perhaps ignorant licenser; destroys the Properties of Authors in their
Copies; and sets up many Monopolies."1 05 This fear of "monopolies of
knowledge" as injurious to the public interest in learning is significant
and noteworthy. It mirrors the same concern of the US constitutional
framers in the next century.106 The printers belonging to the Guild
were furious, but stymied in their efforts to continue their
monopoly. 107
For the period from 1695-1710, there was no Licensing Act and
no special protection for book publishers.108 Anyone could publish
freely. During that fifteen-year period, the printers belonging to the
Stationers' Guild realized they were not going to be able to convince
Parliament to renew their special monopoly. The House of Lords
decision in 1695 to not renew the Licensing Act was to London book
publishers what the Sony v. Universal decision of the Supreme Court
in 1984 was to the Hollywood film producers.109 The Guild needed a
new strategy. Prominent authors, including Wordsworth and Defoe,
had championed greater rights for authors.110 As long as book
publishers could secure rights from authors, it was a clever strategy to
support their efforts. Authors became the "cover"-literally and
philosophically-to advance the publishers' interests.
After several failed efforts, the publishers presented
Parliament with a new act that included the granting of rights to
authors.11 Parliament made two significant changes. The publishers'
plan for "perpetual" rights in each book, similar to their past practice,
102. Id.
103. Id. at 33.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 32.
106. Litman, supra note 2, at 335.
107. ROSE, supra note 2, at 34.
108. Id. at 33-34.
109. Content producers feared that the courts would expand Sony to a personal use
exemption to copyright. See infra Part III.C.
110. ROSE, supra note 2, at 34-41, 110.
111. Id. at 43.
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was reduced drastically to a fourteen-year term.112  Also, the
references to "property" and "rightful owners" in the title of the act
were removed, but the reference to "encouragement of learning" was
retained.113 The title changed from "A Bill for Encouragement of
Learning and for Securing Property of Copies of Books to Rightful
Owners thereof' to "A Bill for Encouragement of Learning by Vesting
the Copies of Printed Books in Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies
during Times Then Mentioned."114
This political compromise meant that publishers would be able
to resume the special protection they had enjoyed under the Licensing
Act, with two modifications. First, this special protection would be
limited to a short period of fourteen years, rather than an indefinite
period under the Licensing Act. 15 Second, publishers were now
required by law to contractually obtain rights from the author."6 In
1710, the British Parliament adopted the Statute of Anne."7
The book publishers did not concede defeat. Between 1710 and
1774, they attempted to convince the courts to recognize a "perpetual"
right in literary property based on a common law right rooted in
principles of natural justice.s18 It was a colorful battle engaging some
of the greatest minds of the day, including the "father" of
Anglo-American jurisprudence, William Blackstone. The series of
decisions became known as the "Battle of the Booksellers.""19
Blackstone argued Millar v. Taylor on behalf of London publishers
arguing for perpetual common law right.120 He is rightfully attributed
with being a primary author of the book publishers' "natural rights"
based argument for a perpetual right to literary property.121 Chief
Justice Mansfield of the King's Bench held in favor of the plaintiffs,
finding that there was a common law perpetual right in literary
property.122 In Donaldson v. Beckett, 123 the London book publishers
sued a rogue Scottish publisher who refused to recognize Millar.124
112. Id. at 45.
113. Id. at 46.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 47.
116. Id. at 46-47.
117. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.).
118. ROSE, supra note 2, at 67-69.
119. Id.
120. See Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.).
121. ROSE, supra note 2, at 90-91.
122. Id. at 69.
123. Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.).
124. Four years following Millar, The Scottish Court of Session ruled that there was no




Judge Blackstone now sat on the King's Bench, and also found for a
common law right in literary property.125 This decision was appealed
to the highest court, which in 1774 was the House of Lords
(comparable to the US Supreme Court in that period).126 The House of
Lords reversed the King's Bench decision, placing Judge Blackstone
on the losing side.127
Contemporary scholars, especially legal scholars, have
misreported what happened (and what did not happen) in the
Donaldson decision.128 There was no reported opinion typical of the
times.129 As scholar Mark Rose has pointed out, a great deal of
confusion occurred in the aftermath of that decision.130 Some modern
commentators have overstated what occurred, hailing the decision as
a promulgation that the utilitarian approach (i.e., limited copyright)
prevailed over the natural rights approach (i.e., unlimited copyright)
to copyright.131 There is no direct evidence to support that contention.
Rather, as Professor Rose notes, it was simply a political act where the
House of Lords affirmed the same judgment that it had held eighty
years earlier when blocking the renewal of the Licensing Act in the
late 1600s.132 The power of the book publishers was too great, and did
not serve the public interest. The House of Lords recognized that the
public interest, namely the encouragement of learning, was served by
the production and dissemination of books.133 It also recognized that
the capital investment required for such activities, and the
uncertainty associated with the marketing of books (compared to other
"necessary" commodities), required the state to support some measure
of monopoly.134 That measure of monopoly necessary to incentivize
the production of books, namely the printing, marketing, and
distribution of books, would be difficult to estimate with precision. It
is clear, however, that in the judgment of those Lords acting in 1709
(during the negotiation and passage of the Statute of Anne), and of
125. ROSE, supra note 2, at 98.
126. Id. at 102-03.
127. Id.
128. See JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOu 470 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2011); ROSE, supra note 2, at 102-03.
129. ROSE, supra note 2, at 102.
130. Id. at 98-99.
131. Id. at 108.
132. Id.
133. This is the author's analysis based on the actions of the House of Lords to retain the
title "encouragement of learning" and drastically reducing the scope of the monopoly to the
publishers. See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.).
134. ROSE, supra note 2, at 43; KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 6-7.
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those Lords who decided Donaldson in 1774, the amount of monopoly
should be much smaller than the publishers desired.135
The US framers adopted a similar view as the House of Lords
in Britain-that copyright was the solution to the problem of
distribution of works of knowledge, rather than creation of those
works.136 It was the London publishers or "book sellers" that had
enjoyed absolute rights to the distribution of their
commodities- books-for nearly two hundred years.137 Authors had
few, if any rights during that period.138 Nevertheless, they wrote
books and sought out publishers to distribute them. The political
solution called for limiting the absolute right to the publisher by
emphasizing the ultimate purpose of the creation and distribution of
works of knowledge in society-the encouragement of learning-or as
used herein, "the advancement of knowledge."139 In the same fashion
as their British cousins, the Framers crafted a private right of action
to achieve a public good, not a private right of action to bestow a
private benefit.
Part III surveys the development of modern copyright
jurisprudence through the lens of copyright's original
justification-the advancement of knowledge. The interests associated
with copyright industries have largely persuaded courts and the
legislature to see the dollar value of copyrighted commodities as the
measure of copyright's value to society.140 This misalignment of
means and ends has created the fallacy that more protection means
more social value. Part IV examines the implications of this fallacy for
the interests of society.
III. DOCTRINE
The explanatory thread that connects the birth of copyright to
its present stage is the story of the interests associated with the
distribution function of copyright.141 Copyright industries-first
publishers, then film, music, and software as well-expanded the
initially narrow, brief right of protection into a broader right, which in
the digital era approaches a perpetual right in their "property."
Modern copyright theory developed in the later stages of the
jurisprudential timeline of copyright, when intellectual property
135. ROSE, supra note 2, at 47.
136. Joyce, supra note 83, at 244.
137. ROSE, supra note 2, at 12.
138. Id. at 12, 18, 22; PATTERSON, supra note 46, at 5.
139. ROSE, supra note 2, at 45-47.
140. See infra Part III.
141. See Joyce, supra note 83, at 244.
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generally became more significant to the US economy.142  This
paralleled the technological revolution of the latter part of the
twentieth century.143
As we cross into the digital era of the twenty-first century,
copyright has reached an inflection point paralleling the British
contest over concentration of economic power in 1690 and 1774.144 In
contemporary US copyright, the landmark 1984 case of Sony
Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.145 in the US
Supreme Court can be viewed as a similar exercise of restraint against
concentration of economic power. By the late twentieth century, the
economic interests included not only book publishers, but also a host
of other "content" producers including film, music, and software
industries. These industries rallied to reestablish their influence in
the decades following that decision.146 These efforts paralleled that of
the London publishers in the late seventeenth to late eighteenth
century in England. Just as the London publishers attempted to
reassert their economic power in the courts following their defeat in
the House of Lords, the contemporary content industries in the United
States strove to reassert their perceived loss of economic power
through the courts and legislature.
In the wake of copyright's birth, book publishers began to push
for an expansion of the narrow, limited right granted by the Statute of
Anne. This initial effort attempted to circumvent the statute by
recognizing a pre-statutory right in literary property grounded in
natural rights theory. As discussed above, the series of decisions
referred to as the Battle of the Booksellers culminated in a final
decision that the only rights that existed were in the statute.147
Interests associated with expansion of the right were left with two
possible strategies: (1) convince the legislature to expand the statute;
or (2) persuade the courts to interpret the statute expansively. They
pursued both.
Copyright jurisprudence is best rationalized on an axis
between restraint and expansion. The first century of American
jurisprudence-1790 through the early 1900s-followed two
doctrinally divergent paths: the traditional approach of restraint that
142. Litman, supra note 2, at 340.
143. See infra Part III.C.
144. See ROSE, supra note 2, at 34, 93; Joyce, supra note 83, at 242-43. The House of
Lords' decision not to renew the Licensing Act in 1690, and its 1774 Donaldson decision ruling
against a perpetual right of copyright weighed against economic concentration. See ROSE, supra
note 2, at 34, 93; Joyce, supra note 83, at 242-43.
145. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
146. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001).
147. See ROSE, supra note 2, at 102-03.
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followed the British sensitivity toward copyright's public interest in
expanding the works of knowledge to the public, and the
pro-expansion approach sympathetic to those commercial interests
who sought to protect their investment.148
Early copyright shifted the analytical focus of follow-on works
from contributing to the public good of copyright to a concern with
incentives for investment in the first-mover investor work. In the
1868 decision of Daly v. Palmer, a dispute between two competing
theatre productions presaged the twentieth century move from literal
to non-literal protection of copyright-a significant leap for the
interests of the first-mover investor.149 Feeling no constraint by literal
infringement, the judge found infringement where the only similarity
between the plays was the theme of a railroad rescue scene-even the
details of the scenes varied.150 The New York judge transparently
supported the commercial interests of the first-mover investor.151
Modern copyright sanctified the doctrinal expansion from
literal to non-literal protection of copyrighted material. As seen in the
next Section, the fledgling film industry of the early twentieth century
faced hold-up problems when playwrights began to apply the Daly
reasoning.152 Judge Hand reacted to this overreaching with the
development of categories of reasoning and analysis-categories that
appealed to legal minds, but intensified the indeterminacy problem for
the creation function of copyright.153
In the digital-transition era, the transformation of copyrighted
material from print to digital format raised the commercial stakes.
Personal reproduction (and distribution) of copyrighted material
became feasible. The Supreme Court's decision in Sony, approving
unauthorized reproduction of television programming by consumers
under the fair use doctrine, alarmed the industry.154 In the wake of
the Internet revolution, the content industries worked to reform
digital copyright to protect their interests.155  Content producers
achieved greater control in the downstream distribution of digital
content; however, the tension between copyright and its public good
objective-encouragement of learning and advancement of
knowledge-had increased.
148. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
149. See Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552).
150. Id. at 1137.
151. Id.
152. See infra notes 272-75 and accompanying text.
153. See infra Part III.B.3.
154. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
155. See LITMAN, supra note 146.
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A. Early Copyright Jurisprudence: Literal Copyright
1. British Pro-Restraint Approach
Copyright jurisprudence in Britain from 1710 to 1790
pre-dated US copyright by nearly a century. Early British decisions
on translations and abridgements demonstrated a favorable attitude
toward reuse of earlier copyrighted material as supplying the public
with more useful works of knowledge.15 6 Analytically, the British
considered the translation or abridgement as a new work capable of
independent copyright, thus not infringing the earlier work." 7 Such
activity was looked on favorably, and even lauded.58 These British
decisions showed a sensitivity and appreciation for the contribution of
later works to the education and learning of society-consistent with
the stated objective of the establishment of copyright in the Statute of
Anne.159
From its inception, copyright jurisprudence was concerned with
the distribution function of copyright. Early British cases rationalized
their liberal or indulgent approach toward reuse of copyrighted works
as aligning the distribution function of copyright with its objectives of
advancement of knowledge and encouragement of learning.6 o A
common scenario giving rise to disputes between publishers involved
abridgements. In the classic abridgement case Gyles v. Wilcox,161
decided in 1740, the publisher of Sir Matthew Hale's Pleas of the
Crown had pursued an infringement action against the publisher of an
abridged version called Modern Crown Law.162  In finding no
infringement, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said, "abridgements may
with great propriety be called a new book, because not only the paper
and print, but the invention, learning and the judgment of the author
is shown in them." 6 3 As Professor Kaplan noted, Lord Mansfield, in
the 1785 map case of Sayre v. Moore, stated his concern with
supporting the endeavors of follow-on creators whose improvements
156. See infra Part III.A.1.
157. KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 16-17; ROSE, supra note 2, at 133.
158. KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 22; Samuelson, supra note 41, at 1506-08.
159. KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 10-11.
160. Id. at 17 (quoting Lord Mansfield in his famous decision Sayre v. Moore (1785), 102
Eng. Rep. 139 (K.B.), where the court favored the follow-on work so that "the world may not be
deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded").
161. (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.).
162. KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 10-11; ROSE, supra note 2, at 51.
163. KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 10-11.
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on earlier works benefit society.164 This sentiment supported the
general rule of finding no infringement with abridgements.
2. American Pro-Expansion Framework
In a trio of cases-Gray v. Russell, Emerson v. Davies, and
Folsom v. Marsh-Justice Story laid the groundwork for a reversal of
the earlier British approach.165 He set an alternate direction for
copyright jurisprudence, which contrasted with those decisions of his
period that followed the eighteenth century British jurisprudence.166
Justice Story selectively relied on British precedent that allowed him
to fashion a different rule that also yielded a different outcome-one
that favored first-mover investors and the commercial interests
invested in the first publication of material.167
In a fact pattern very similar to the British abridgement cases,
Justice Story in Folsom found an abridgement of George Washington's
biography infringing.168 Justice Story did not buy the "new book"
rationale, and was not sensitive to the "contribution to the benefit of
society" rationale.169 Rather, he was sympathetic to the "taking"
rationale of the first-mover investor.170 He developed an alternate
framework supportive of the commercial interests associated with
first-mover investors in the exploitation of copyrighted assets.'7' His
analytical move was to view the follow-on work as a "taking," rather
than a "new work."1 72 This significant philosophical difference reflects
the growing importance and influence of the commercial interests
associated with the first-mover investor in copyright-the content
producer claiming the earlier copyright. In Justice Story's time, these
interests were those of book publishers, who had invested in the
printing and distribution of the earlier work, and believed an unlawful
taking had occurred when the follow-on work reused some of its
content. 173
164. Id. at 11, 16-17 (additionally discussing two other British abridgement opinions
where the court found no infringement); Samuelson, supra note 41, at 1506-08.
165. KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 27-29.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 27-28. Professor Kaplan notes that Justice Story was a "chief American
expositor and reinterpretor of English copyright doctrine." Id. at 27.




172. Id. at 27-28.
173. Id. at 22. Professor Kaplan notes that British doctrine had begun to question the
"indulgent attitude toward using other people's works [as] increasingly out of keeping with the
realities of the market." Id.
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Justice Story is famous for being the father of the "fair use"
doctrine of copyright. In his famous opinion cited for that doctrine,
Folsom, Justice Story did not use the term "fair use."174 He merely
articulated a factor test for determining if reuse is infringing or
excused, but that factor test would later be coined as the "fair use"
test.1 75 Folsom is part of a trio of "Story decisions" that articulated a
departure in infringement analysis from the earlier British
approach.176 Instead of an indulgent, liberal approach toward reuse of
material as benefiting society, Justice Story viewed the reuse in
commercial terms, and he analyzed how it impacted the investment
decisions of those investing in the early distribution of copyrighted
works.177 As Professor Kaplan noted, there was a "reshuffling of
doctrine" in the nineteenth century-the shift in the indulgent
attitude toward reuse of material associated with eighteenth century
copyright jurisprudence.1 8
Folsom concerned the abridgement of George Washington's
biography.179 Instead of applying the classic abridgement rule favoring
follow-on works, Justice Story took the opportunity to fashion a new
rule, really a new standard or test.180 He relied most heavily on brief
dicta by Lord Cottenham in his Bramwell v. Halcomb opinion about
the appropriate approach to reuse of prior work.18 1 Justice Story
relied on Lord Cottenham's musing about whether the question of
legitimate reuse was not a matter of the quantity taken, but the value
of the earlier work.182 Justice Story did not focus on the contribution
174. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
175. These uses are determined on a fact-specific basis by weighing four factors: (1) the
purpose and character of the "fair use"; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the impact of
the use on the market of the rights holder; and (4) the amount and substantiality of the portion
of the work used. It is a standard, not a rule that must be applied by the court subsequent o the
"use" of the work by the party claiming the privilege. Id. In his opinion, Lawrence v. Dana, Judge
Clifford, relying particularly on Folsom v. Marsh, coined the term "fair use." 15 F. Cas. 26, 60
(C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136). The fair use factor test has been codified in the 1976 Copyright
Act. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
176. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 342.
177. John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 465, 480-81 (2005).
178. KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 22.
179. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345; KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 27-28.
180. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348.
181. (1836) 40 Eng. Rep. at 1110; In dicta, Lord Cottenham mused about the appropriate
test for infringement, saying, "[w]hen it comes to a question of quantity, it must be very vague.
One writer might take all the vital part of another's book, though it might be but a small
proportion of the book in quantity. It is not only quantity but value that is always looked to." Id.
The plaintiff passed away shortly after, and the case was not pursued. Id.
182. See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348. Justice Story finds that:
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of the follow-on work to the public good because his property approach
of looking at reuse of material as a "taking" meant that the market
impact on earlier work was the priority.183
Although the fair use doctrine in the twentieth century became
the touchstone for pro-restraint forces, it is more properly viewed in
its historical context as moving copyright from pro-restraint to
pro-expansion.18 4  As discussed below, its methodological approach
does not support the knowledge production processes, which require
ex ante certainty with respect to access to the knowledge resources of
the intellectual commons.1'8 Justice Story's balancing test relied on
each judge subjectively determining how much weight to allocate to
any particular factor.186
Justice Story's pro-expansion approach to copyright was still
limited to the literal elements of copyright. Even if the whole of the
book was not reused, it was the text or literal elements of the text that
were reused. The next move in the expansion of the protection right
included non-literal elements in the "taking" analysis, which evolved
into the modern "substantial similarity" doctrine.187 The 1868 district
court decision Daly v. Palmer188 signaled the shift in doctrinal
development. Modern fair use doctrine evolved as the scope of
copyright expanded from literal to non-literal elements of the work,
developing into a doctrine that can be seen as a brake on overreaching
by first-mover investor.
3. Emergence of Non-Literal Protection
Justice Story's jurisprudence represented a pro-expansion shift
away from the US line of cases following the British approach of
pro-restraint. 189 His decisions, however, still involved copying of the
In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of
the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which
the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits . . .of the original work.
Id.
183. See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. 342.
184. Tehranian, supra note 128.
185. See infra Part IV.B.2.
186. Id.
187. See Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552).
188. Id.
189. In Wheaton v. Peters, the Supreme Court followed the British precedent of
Donaldson v. Beckett, holding that there was no independent common law right in literary
property. 33 U.S. 591, 686 (1834). In Stowe v. Thomas, Judge Grier, followed British precedent
that a translation was not infringing. 23 F. Cas. 201, 208 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514). It was
a case of first impression in the United States regarding the rights of a copyright owner (Harriet
Beecher Stowe) in a translation of its work (German translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin). Id. at
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literal elements of the copyrighted material. The next pro-expansion
move in copyright was the protection of non-literal elements of the
copyrighted work. By the early second half of the nineteenth century,
the economic interests associated with copyright had evolved from
exclusively books to include dramatization of written works, i.e.,
plays. 190
Only a short period after the Story decisions, New York district
judge, Samuel Blatchford, took the pro-expansion path that Justice
Story had charted even further. In 1868, one theatre producer sought
to enjoin another theatre producer from producing a popular
competing play in New York City.191 The two plays, called Under the
Gaslight and After Dark involved different plots, dialogue, and
characters.192 The similarity at issue was that both contained a
"railroad rescue scene."'93 The characterization of the railroad scene
also differed-in one case it involved a woman being rescued, and the
other, a man being rescued.194 The location of the rescue varied as
well.'9 5 Nevertheless, the judge who decided Daly v. Palmer96 cited
Justice Story's opinions, as well as the British precedent, D'Almaine,
and found infringement.9 7
Reading the opinion, there is ample reference to the
commercial success of the first play, and particularly to the audience's
enjoyment of the "railroad rescue scene."98 The court reasoned that if
an element of the second work (e.g., railroad scene) elicits similar
emotions or sensations as a similar (i.e., non-literal) element in an
earlier work, then the second work can be infringing of the rights
holder in the first work, and subject to injunctive relief.199 Just like
Justice Story, the court focused more on the "taking" then the value of
the new work and its potential benefit to the public good.2 00 The scope
of "copy" in the statute has become very broad, broader arguably than
201. Quoting William Blackstone, the plaintiffs attorney argued that natural rights of the
author should lead the court to enjoin the translation. Id. at 202 n.2.
190. KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 30-31.
191. Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1133-34.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1134.
195. Id. at 1133-34.
196. Id. at 1132.
197. Id. at 1136.
198. Id. at 1133.
199. Id. at 1138.
200. Id. at 1138-39.
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even William Blackstone could have envisioned or hoped for one
hundred years earlier.201
The increasing economic stakes associated with copyright drove
this shift in focus in infringement analysis. The earlier pro-restraint
bias toward follow-on works as contributing to purposes of copyright
was replaced by one favoring the first-mover investor in the
copyrighted asset. As Kaplan noted:
An indulgent attitude toward using other people's works seemed out of keeping with the
realities of the market. The business of publishing and distributing books had become
bigger, more competitive, more impersonal; the stakes were higher, the risks more
serious. In this atmosphere, there would be even greater anxiety about marking out the
metes and bounds of literary ownership, and courts might be expected to respond to
arguments about protection of investment.2 0
2
In the early twentieth century, Justice Holmes and Judge
Hand would take copyright in the direction that Justice Story was
headed, and that the Daly court had pushed even further toward
favoring the protection of investment in first-mover investor's
copyrighted assets. Judge Hand's jurisprudence reified this broader
non-literal scope of copyright while moving to limit its reach with the
fashioning of another doctrine, known in modern copyright
jurisprudence as the idea-expression dichotomy. This represents the
reconceptualization of copyright from the early British approach
focused on the contributions to society's storehouse of knowledge to
the modern US approach of the protection of the interests of
investment.
B. Modern Copyright Jurisprudence-Print Era
Copyright jurisprudence was at an adolescent stage at the turn
of the twentieth century. The expansion of copyright in the twentieth
century occurred alongside the increasing commercialization of
industries that benefited from and relied upon the protection that
copyright afforded in the marketplace. By the end of the nineteenth
century, not only were books, maps, and charts covered, but also
music, dramatizations (theatre productions), and translations.203
Industries such as theatre and music, which had not been included in
the copyright regime at its inception, were prime beneficiaries of the
system at the turn of the twentieth century.
201. In 1869, T.W. Clarke wrote in the American Law Review an article criticizing the
Daly decision for injecting a property approach into copyright jurisprudence. KAPLAN, supra note
14, at 32 ("Mr. T.W. Clarke lamented that this 'is the first decision which has established a
property in incident."').
202. KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 22.
203. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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The chief actor in the story of modern copyright jurisprudence
is Judge Hand, but Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' earlier influence
on copyright generally, and on Judge Hand in particular, is
significant.
Justice Holmes expanded the subject matter and commercial
stakes of copyright. His decisions reified the concept of originality in
copyright as a very low threshold, favorable to the first-mover investor
in copyrighted material.204  Judge Hand constructed a personal
framework for copyright which became the twentieth-century modern
copyright jurisprudence standard.205  He is credited with the
development of modern copyright's concepts of originality, substantial
similarity, and idea-expression dichotomy.206 Judge Hand's colorful
and poetic writing belies a keen awareness of the commercial stakes at
issue in the contests that came before him. He could move in one
direction, then cleverly pivot 180 degrees with the poetic cover of his
opinions. In his early decisions as a district court judge, particularly
in two music cases, Judge Hand moves copyright in a pro-expansion
path, further reversing the earlier British approach of pro-restraint.2 07
In his next phase, while sitting on the Second Circuit, Judge
Hand refined the substantial similarity analysis by creating the
idea-expression doctrine to push back on the potentially infinite reach
of the substantial similarity's elasticity.2 08 In his film cases, Judge
Hand shifted direction by finding some limitations on the extensive
scope of protection found in his music decisions, and by making new
law on remedies.209
The result of the evolution of Hand's doctrines is
indeterminacy, which has had adverse implications for the public good
of copyright.210 Each of these analytical categories shares a common
methodological bias. They are applied with ex post, rather than ex
ante reasoning to draw appropriate lines between competing economic
interests. Ex post reasoning relies on subjective factor analysis of the
204. KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 41.
205. Id. Madison notes that Judge Hand's abstractions test for the idea-expression
dichotomy is "the most famous (if still unclear) analytic tool in this area . . . ." Michael J.
Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1689-90
(2004).
206. KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 41.
207. See infra Part III.B.2.
208. See infra Part III.B.3.
209. Id.
210. Indeterminacy refers to the lack of coherency in the doctrinal outcomes. Many
copyright scholars have noted the indeterminacy problem in copyright doctrine. See infra Part
III.B.
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specific facts of the dispute.211 In contrast, ex ante reasoning relies on
bright-line rules that can predict outcomes prior to an actual
dispute.212 The methodological distinction between ex ante and ex
post reasoning is significant because the ex post approach has led to
an indeterminacy problem in copyright, as the outcome is less
predictable. Scholars have largely neglected the effect of this
methodological indeterminacy on the creation function of copyright.213
1. The Romantic Movement and Its Influence On Copyright
A significant movement of the nineteenth century that would
affect the later course of copyright jurisprudence was the Romantic
Movement in literature and philosophy.214 Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, was an avid adherent of the movement.215 The
main tenet carried over to the law from this movement was the notion
that originality in art is represented by the individual's reaction to
nature. It can also be referred to as the "sole genius" theory.216 This
Romantic genius philosophy informed three core constructs of modern
copyright jurisprudence: originality, authorship, and substantial
similarity doctrine of infringement.
Judge Hand, also an adherent of Romantic philosophy,
reified Justice Holmes' idealization of Romanticism into his own
personal conception of copyright's definition of originality. Romantic
philosophy infused the concept of "author" and "authorship" with an
211. A posteriori reasoning functions by weighing various factors as they are applied to
the specific facts of the case.
212. Ex ante reasoning operates by applying a general rule to behavior. For example, a
criminal law that mandates anyone under the age of twenty-one is prohibited from drinking
alcohol is predictable in its application. Once one's age if verified, the outcome is clear.
213. See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND
(Yale Univ. Press 2008), available at http://thepublicdomain.org/thepubliedomainl.pdf;
TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL CULTURE (MIT Press
2007); DEBORA J. HALBERT, RESISTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2005); VAIDHYANATHAN,
supra note 13; Elizabeth L. Mitchell, Shamans, Software and Spleens: Law and the Construction
of the Information Society 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 377 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS (Harvard Univ. Press 1996); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257
(2006).
214. KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 34-35, 43, 117; Jaszi, supra note 23, at 459-60; see also
Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the
Emergence of the "Author", 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 428-30 (1984) (detailing the
Romantic conviction that the author-genius was someone who created something entirely new
and unprecedented).
215. Justice Holmes draws from Romantic theory in his famous opinion, Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., where he states that "[t]he copy is the personal reaction of an
individual upon nature. Personality always contains something unique." 188 U.S. 239, 250
(1903).
216. Jaszi, supra note 23, at 481-83.
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unassailable character of ownership. Since Romantic philosophy
assumed that the work reflects the unique perspective of the
individual author, any similarity to preceding works is dismissed as
irrelevant.217 It corresponds with the expanding scope of protection
that copyright affords in the marketplace. By the turn of the century,
copyright applied not only to books, but dramatizations (plays), music,
and would soon apply to film. 2 1 8 Investors in these industries wanted
more certainty with respect to their copyrighted material (i.e.,
assets).219 Certainty was increased if they could be assured that the
title in their asset could not easily be challenged. If the originality of
the work, or even the sole ownership of the work, could be challenged,
then the return on their investment would be diluted. The
jurisprudential trend toward unassailable originality and bias against
the collective nature of creativity benefited their interests.220
Romantic theory aligned, if indirectly, with the interests of the
first-mover investor who favored certainty in the title to their asset.
Doctrinally, Judge Hand's jurisprudence sanctified copyright's shift
from protection of the literal to non-literal elements of the prior work
that began in the late nineteenth century with Daly.2 2 1
The next Section examines several of Judge Hand's decisions
that shaped modern copyright jurisprudence. In his early music
decisions, Judge Hand moves copyright in a pro-expansion path,
further reversing the earlier British approach of pro-restraint.
However, in later cases involving film, Judge Hand reacts to possible
overreaching by a first-mover investor by constructing new categories
to be considered in the substantial similarity analysis, as well as
remedies analysis to limit the liability of the follow-on investor.
217. See infra Part III.B.2.
218. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-1088 (repealed 1978).
219. Investors were happy for the courts to rely on Romantic theory to support a broad
protection right in the non-literal aspects of the copyrighted works (i.e., assets). Both Justice
Holmes and Judge Hand were influenced by the monetary stakes of copyrighted works. In his
landmark decision Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithograph Co., Justice Holmes commented that
"[clertainly works are not the less connected with the fine arts because their pictorial quality
attracts the crowd and therefore gives them a real use-if the use means to increase trade and to
help to make money." 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). As scholar Siva Vaidhyanathan notes, Justice
Holmes had experienced frustration failing to prevail in copyright cases of his own. See
VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 13, at 95. Vaidhyanathan also quotes Judge Hand, "While the
public taste continues to give pecuniary value to a composition of no artistic excellence, the court
must continue to recognize the value so created." Id. at 105.
220. Investors had to be aware of other similar works in the marketplace. This explains
Hollywood's extensive licensing system. See Horowitz, supra note 31 at 337 ("Above all, the
copyright holder wants a reliably valid entitlement."). Horowitz goes on to note how originality is
a very "permissive" standard. Id.
221. Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552).
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2. Originality and Substantial Similarity: The Music Cases
Judge Hand developed a personal vision of copyright that
largely became the blueprint for copyright jurisprudence in the
modern age of print copyright. One of the hallmarks of Judge Hand's
jurisprudence is that the originality of the prior work was presumed,
rather than proven.222 The salient characteristic of Judge Hand's
approach is malleability, by the court, but its strength is also its
limitation-its subjectivity and indeterminacy.
In 1910, Judge Hand, then a district judge in New York,
authored the opinion Hein v. Harris,223 which resolved a dispute
between dueling music publishers. The earlier publisher's song was
called "I Think I Hear a Woodpecker Knocking at My Family Tree,"
while the later publisher's song was called "The Arab Love Story."224
The major issue in the case was the question of the originality of the
earlier song.2 2 5 The defendant pointed to several songs preceding the
plaintiffs song that were very similar.226 Judge Hand dismissed this
argument, on the basis that borrowing in general from another style is
not enough.227 He noted that "the right of the author of a musical
composition is not affected by the fact that he has borrowed in general
from the style of his predecessors."228 He went on to say those notes
borrowed "become[] his own, even though strongly suggestive of what
has preceded .... " 2 2 9
In Hein, Judge Hand developed his substantial similarity
doctrine of infringement.2 3 0 Judge Hand cited no legal authority.231
Rather, the opinion contains a detailed comparison of the elements of
each song, which reads more like the work of a music critic than a
district judge.232  Between the two songs at bar, the words were
different, and the musical composition was not identical.233 Judge
Hand noted other differences, such as the keys, and the fact that not
222. See infra Part III.B.2.









232. Id. at 876. For example, in the first paragraph of the opinion, Judge Hand speaks of
the songs written in the "same measure, called 'common time' . . . in the minor mode." Id. He




all notes were identical.234 However, certain notes of the melody were
similar.235 Judge Hand noted, "The quantity of the notes is not
precisely similar; but when they are played in succession it would take
the ear of a person skilled in music to distinguish between them."23 6 It
was sufficient that in his opinion, the similarity between the songs
was recognizable to "the ears of all." 2 3 7 Here, Justice Story's analytical
approach is at work, as well as Daly's reliance on D'Almaine: is the
similarity sufficient to uphold the plaintiffs claim of a "taking?" The
logic of the case is that the defendant's song followed the plaintiffs
song in time, it was similar, and therefore it infringed.
Fourteen years after Hein, Judge Hand delivered another
music publishing opinion, Fisher v. Dillingham,238 which also raised
the originality question. Judge Hand did not dismiss originality out of
hand; he just made it irrelevant because the test is so weak for the
plaintiff to meet. Fisher involved the claim that a few notes used as
an ostinato in both pieces infringed the earlier work's copyright.2 39
The defendant argued that the plaintiffs piece was not original, and
presented several examples of how the plaintiffs piece borrowed from
the public domain.240 Judge Hand destroyed this argument with the
simple assertion that even if the plaintiffs work drew on works in the
public domain, it was still possible that the plaintiffs work was
original because it was the "spontaneous, unsuggested result of the
author's imagination."241  This unprovable claim resonates with
Romantic philosophy. Judge Hand supported the contention that the
plaintiffs work was original by relying on the theory that two similar
works could coexist in copyright.242 He spent the large majority of the
opinion discussing two bases of support for this theory.243 After citing
cases, he included lengthy academic discussion by treatise writers of
the period.244 Hand concluded that even a minor variation on a public




237. Id. Judge Hand wrote, "[iut is true that the keys are different; but this is a
distinction which is of no consequence to the ears of all but those especially skilled in music . . .
Id.
238. 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
239. Id. at 147.
240. Id. at 148.
241. Id. at 149.
242. Id.
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the defendant may have also been original in his creation.246 As seen
in the infringement analysis below, Judge Hand did not apply the
same reasoning to support the defendant's contention that he
independently created the notes.
Once originality was met in Fisher, Judge Hand easily found
enough similarity in the eight notes that comprised the ostinato to
meet the infringement test.2 4 7 "The argument is a strong one. Not
only is the figure in each piece exactly alike, but it is used in the same
way; that is, as an 'ostinato' accompaniment ... . "248 Interestingly,
Judge Hand spent significant space in the opinion disclaiming an
inference that the defendant knowingly pirated the work from the
plaintiff. 24 9  This was Judge Hand's (in)famous statement about
unconscious copying.250 The defendant claimed no knowledge of the
earlier work (including the infringing notes), and the plaintiff did not
prove access or actual copying.251 Judge Hand did not challenge the
defendant's intent, but rather comforted himself with the idea that the
defendant unconsciously was aware of the infringing notes and reused
them in his piece.252 To assuage the defendant, he spoke highly of his
reputation and accepted that he may have "unconsciously copied the
figure."253 There would seem to be little limit to the inference of intent
to copy as long as the judge found sufficient similarity and "value"
between the follow-on work and the earlier work.2 54
A third opinion reflects the malleability of the jurisprudential
framework in the hands of Judge Hand. In 1936, Judge Hand, sitting
on the Second Circuit, authored the Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks
Music Corp. opinion.255 In this case, originality was not disputed.256
Like Judge Hand's prior opinions, there was extensive discussion
about the reputation of the composers and a dissection and
comparison of the elements of the respective pieces of work.2 5 7 Judge
Hand went out of his way to note that Hein does not apply because the
court was incorrect to imply that independent creation was not a
246. Id. at 152.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 148.
249. Id. at 147.
250. Id. Judge Hand suggests defendant's mind may have played a trick on him. See id.
Judge Hand cannot see "how else to account for a similarity, which amounts to identity." Id. He
then has no problem finding plaintiffs piece original in spite of similar prior art. Id. at 148.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 147-48.
253. Id. at 147.
254. Id.





defense to infringement.25 8 Then what about Fisher? Certainly Fisher
seemed to have a good argument that he independently created the
work. Judge Hand was very sympathetic to the defendant in Arnstein.
He carried out a very subjective (if not of questionable relevance)
discussion of the reputations of the composers.259 The plaintiff argued
that collaborators of the defendant had access to plaintiffs song.260
Judge Hand disposed of this argument with the statement hat those
collaborators had so little talent they could not have composed the
song at issue.261 Would that not support the opposite argument of
stealing someone else's work? In the facts before him, Judge Hand
decided to make some space for similar works where it favors the
defendant.262
The consistency in Judge Hand's opinions is his overwhelming
commitment to the unassailable nature of originality. In the music
cases, Judge Hand developed the originality concept embedded with
Romantic philosophy-a subjective response to nature and unique to
the creator. Of course, the same credit is not given to the defendant's
work. His work is judged by a different standard: similarity (in the
mind of the judge) to the prior work.
Substantial similarity is the doctrinal cover for Daly reasoning.
The first-mover is granted the presumption of originality.263 In Judge
Hand's early decisions, substantial similarity has a broad, possibly
infinite reach.264 Any recognizable similarity between the plaintiffs
and defendant's expression is enough to find liability. 265 It is clear
that Judge Hand used a different standard for "originality" than for
"copying."266  Analytically, Judge Hand had reversed the British
approach, which saw follow-on works that reuse prior work as
potentially benefiting the public good of advancing the knowledge and
education of society.267 Judge Hand's approach is to analyze the
258. Id.
259. Id. at 276-77.
260. Id. at 275.
261. Id. at 276.
262. Id. at 277.
263. Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552). The defendant
attempted in vain to show that the "railroad rescue scene" had been used before the plaintiffs
copyright. Id. at 1134.
264. This is the author's analysis based on the above discussion of Judge Hand's
approach in Hein and Fisher.
265. See, for example, the discussion above of Hein and Judge Hand's remark that the
similarities were "recognizable to the ears of all."
266. Judge Hand clearly applied a different standard to similarity of plaintiff's work to
preceding works than similarity between plaintiff's work and defendant's work. See supra notes
229-53 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Part III.A.1.
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commercial benefits and costs of his decisions, responding to the
perceived interests of the litigants before him.
On the Second Circuit, Judge Hand moved in a different
direction, developing doctrines to rein in the potentially infinite reach
of substantial similarity. His entire analysis relied on ex post
reasoning: the weighing of the facts to subjectively determine the
outcome.268 The subjectivity in this methodological approach leads to
a significant indeterminacy problem. As discussed below, the
knowledge production process flourishes with ex ante rules that
support predictability in the outcome.269
In the film cases, discussed below, the plaintiffs pushed to
expand these flexible boundaries of protection. Judge Hand reacted
against such "overreaching" by developing other devices, relying on ex
post reasoning to resist such perceived "overreach"-the doctrines of
idea-expression and remedies.270
3. Idea-Expression Doctrine: The Film Cases
Nichols v. Universal involved the plaintiff playwright Anne
Nichols, claiming that her play, Abie's Irish Rose, was infringed by the
defendant, Universal Pictures Corp, in their production of the film The
Cohens and The Kellys. 2 7 1 The plaintiff had prepared, in the words of
the opinion, "an elaborate analysis of the two plays, showing a
'quadrangle' of the common characters, in which each is represented
by the emotions which he discovers."272 Judge Hand viewed his
objective as deciding whether the infringing portion of the follow-on
work should be determined to be an "expression," and thus
protectable, or merely an "idea," and not protectable.273
The playwright plaintiff relied on Daly to argue that the
filmmakers infringed her copyright.274 The plaintiffs case seemed to
be as strong as Daly's, but Judge Hand did not feel comfortable with
268. See supra notes 229-53 and accompanying text.
269. See infra Part IV.B.
270. In his 1939 opinion, Sheldon v. MGM, Judge Hand found liability on the part of the
film producer although arguably the materials originated in the public domain. See Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1939). Here Judge Hand limited the
liability of the defendant, reducing significantly the damages, by creating new norms in
copyright. In earlier copyright cases like Daly v. Palmer, the defendant was enjoined from
distributing the work. Judge Hand drew lines between competing economic interests that
arguably satisfied both parties. Professor Kaplan criticizes Judge Hand for not considering
originality in the Sheldon case. See KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 1-2.
271. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1930).
272. Id. at 122.
273. Id. at 121.
274. KAPIAN, supra note 14, at 47.
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that outcome. Judge Hand probably sensed the implications for
investment in follow-on works if the first-mover investor could push
the boundaries of protection so far. He engaged in a detailed textual
analysis of the play, delving deeply into the plot structure and
character development, similar to Judge Samuel Blatchford in Daly.2 7 5
Rather than attack originality directly, Judge Hand developed a
theory to support this outcome of no infringement.276  Certain
elements of a story were so common and generic that they did not
warrant protection.277 This theory makes economic sense, as it places
a limit on the first investor such that a subsequent investor has room
to develop its asset. Following Judge Hand's jurisprudence, Judge
Yankwich coined the phrase "scenes a faire" to refer to stock elements
that are so common and generic as to not warrant protection.278 These
were tools for the jurist to fashion an outcome on the "idea" side of the
idea-expression dichotomy without having to attack originality.
Judge Hand and Justice Holmes took copyright in a
counter-intuitive direction with respect to originality or novelty.
Originality was something presumed, rather than proven. The
first-mover investor could assert prima facie evidence of originality by
merely asserting the copyright. As any copyright lawyer knows, there
is no process whereby the Copyright Office determines originality
or, in the parlance of patent law, novelty. Judge Hand was
transparent about the ambiguity of this line-drawing.279  In his
famous, often-quoted statement, he says "[n]obody has ever been able
to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can."2 80 Judge Hand replicates
Justice Story's ex post approach to reuse of prior works in the line
drawing analysis of substantial similarity and idea-expression.2 8 1
Substantial similarity infringement analysis must do the work
that originality simply cannot do. For copyright's implications for
knowledge and education, it means there is no certainty of access
to copyrighted material for the researcher or student. This
indeterminacy problem can be rationalized if the main purpose of the
jurisprudence is to navigate reasonable outcomes among competing
economic interests on an ad hoc basis. If this is the doctrine that
275. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120-21.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 122. "There are but four characters common to both plays, the lovers and
the fathers." Id. In response to detailed comparative analysis of the plays, Judge Hand said, "the
adjectives employed are so general as to be quite useless." Id.
278. See Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
279. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
280. Id.
281. There are no ex ante "bright-line" rules for determining whether infringement has
occurred.
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society relies upon to ensure access to knowledge resources, namely
copyrighted works of knowledge, then it poses serious problems. The
result is indeterminacy, and adverse implications for the public good
of copyright.
The next Section begins with the relatively famous modern
Supreme Court case, Sony v. Universal.282 The context of this case is
important. The second half of the twentieth century saw the
technological revolution of digital media. During the digital transition
phase, physical copies of media products were delivered in digital
format. These formats like floppy disks, CDs, and DVDs
revolutionized the delivery method of entertainment products. The
potential financial impact of the unauthorized reproduction of these
digital products alarmed the content industry.283  This fear over
potential financial losses drove their feisty battle with Sony to compel
VCR manufacturers to integrate copy control measures in their
machines.284 As discussed below, the close decision by the Supreme
Court in favor of Sony represents the zenith of the fair use doctrine.285
In the wake of that decision, the industry worked vigorously to shape
copyright law to protect their interests in the face of pure digital
transmission of copyrighted materials, where the stakes would be
even higher.28 6 In the view of copyright holders, especially those in
the well-funded and powerful film and music industries, the limiting
doctrine of "fair use" threatened to swallow up the whole.2 8 7 The
content producers-led by the film and music industries, as well as
publishing and later software-strove to reverse this trend. That
effort resulted in the passage of the Section 1201 anti-circumvention
282. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
283. The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) claimed in its
2010 report that digital piracy caused the loss of one-third of its commercial value over seven
years from 2004 through 2009. See INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, DIGITAL MUSIC
REPORT 3 (2010), available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2010.pdf. The Recording
Industry Association of America (RIAA) claims the loss of $12.5 billion as a result of digital
piracy. See Who Music Theft Hurts, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content
selector=piracy-details-online (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
284. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
285. See infra Part III.C.
286. See infra Part III.C.
287. Testifying before Congress in support of the DMCA, Richard Parsons, CEO of
TimeWarner argued that piracy on the Internet was "an assault on everything that constitutes
cultural expression of our society." He went on to claim that in the absence of the protections
that the content industry requested, "culture will atrophy.... The country will end up in a sort
of cultural Dark Ages." GILLESPIE, supra note 213, at 108. Siva Vaidhyanathan notes that the
Clinton Administration's report titled Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, referred to as
the White Paper, published in 1995, which served as the blueprint for the DMCA, referred to fair
use as a "tax" on owners of copyrighted material. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 13, at 159.
Essentially the DMCA closed the "fair use" loophole. See id.
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provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 288 The
threat of commercial piracy and the significance of the industries'
interests to the economy convinced policymakers to pass the DMCA. 2 89
The DMCA represented the industry's success in protecting
their interests.290 Pro-restraint doctrines of the twentieth century of
fair use and first sale are swallowed up by the statutory act.2 9 1 Critics
have railed against these effects since the passage of the Act, to little
avail.2 9 2 This Article argues against the approach of attempting to
retrofit digital copyright (i.e., DMCA) with print-era fair use. Fair use
is a doctrine concerned with the distribution of content, not its
creation. A defendant raises the defense of fair use to claim that its
distribution of copyrighted material should not be infringing (or
alternatively, infringing but without liability because of the fair use
defense).293 This defense only applies when the creation of the content
has already occurred. To advance the public good of copyright, namely
encouragement of learning and advancement of knowledge, then
access to all material is required ex ante to the creation process,
rather than a portion of it ex post to the creation process. A
researcher, student, or scholar cannot rely on the fair use doctrine to
determine if its use of the material for learning would be
non-infringing. In fact, it probably will not be non-infringing, as it
requires access to all the material, not some uncertain portion of the
material. As discussed in Part IV, if the researcher, scholar, or
student creates something from that use, then she will still be subject
to the doctrines concerned with distribution.2 9 4 As discussed in more
detail below, the focus of this inquiry is making space for copyright to
advance knowledge and learning, rather than reforming the
distribution function of copyright.
C. Back to the Future-Digital Transition and Pure Digital
Technological advancement in the latter half of the twentieth
century posed some serious challenges to the business models of
copyright industries, particularly film, music, and publishing. The
288. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860.
289. See LITMAN, supra note 146.
290. See Litman, supra note 2, at 346.
291. See Tehranian, supra note 1, at 537-39.
292. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 30, at 1011-14 (noting that the effect of the DMCA
provision on libraries is that "the value of making works widely available, for edification and
enlightenment without overt transformation, is lost"). The effort by public libraries to persuade
the Copyright Registrar to grant a broad fair use exception to the Section 1201 provisions of the
DMCA failed. See infra note 322 and accompanying text.
293. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
294. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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photocopier was viewed by the publishing industry as a giant
infringement machine.295 The transformation of content to digital
form, but still packaged as a physical, portable commodity is referred
to herein as the "digital transition" period of copyright.2 9 6 Common
contemporary examples include the CD format in music and the DVD
format in film. Before CDs and DVDs, there were audio and
videocassette tapes. Responding to market demand, the consumer
electronic industry produced players and recorders to the consuming
public. Unlike the print era where consumers relied on content
producers to produce and distribute the content, the digital transition
era meant that consumers could become producers and distributors of
copyrighted material in their own right. Not surprisingly, the
content industry became concerned that consumers could make
multiple copies of content, thus depriving them of future sales. The
pro-restraint camp of copyright saw this as legitimate fair use,
whereas the pro-expansion adherents viewed this activity as illegal
copying.
This technological shift forced the courts to address several
issues: (1) what constitutes a copy for purposes of the Copyright Act;
(2) to what extent would the terms of the license agreement drafted by
the copyright owner trump copyright law; and (3) assuming a copy has
been made, and infringement liability would follow, would the accused
infringer be excused from copying for personal use under the fair use
doctrine of copyright? The content industry favored the broadest
interpretation of its protection right. For the film and music
industries, that meant that unauthorized personal use copying
constituted infringement, and for the software industry, any use of the
computer program inconsistent with the license agreement should
295. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Basic Books, Inc.
v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Peter B. Hirtle, Research,
Libraries, and Fair Use: The Gentlemen's Agreement of 1935, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOCY U.S.A. 545,
546 (2006). There were some early struggles between publishers and libraries over permitted use
that would not be infringing. As the photocopier became available to corporations and to the
consuming public, publishers began to fight back. Publishers resisted the libraries' call for some
fair use guidelines until they feared a worse outcome by the courts. At the time, it was still the
print era and libraries merely wanted assurance that they could print copies either for inter-
library loan or for archival purposes. The 1976 Act for the first time codified fair use, and
included some specific provisions benefiting libraries. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2012). With respect to
the public, publishers were forced to accept a compromise whereby printing companies would
post copyright notices, but not be liable for the potential infringement of their customers. See
Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1535.
296. "Digital transition" is the author's term for this transition period of distribution of




trigger liability and injunctive relief.2 9 7 Four decisions, two by the
Supreme Court and two by circuit courts, defined the legal boundaries
posed by these questions. The Supreme Court decisions, Sony v.
Universal298 and MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster,299 addressed the
question of copying and fair use in the film and music context. The
circuit court decisions, ProCD v. Zeidenberg300 and MAI v. Peak,301
addressed the question of copying and the enforceability of license
agreement restrictions in the software industry context. As discussed
below, Sony appeared to signal an indulgent view toward personal use
copying as permissible under fair use.3 0 2 Grokster pushed back the
pendulum toward a stricter view of permissible fair use even for
personal copying.303 This perceived setback by Sony and possible
uncertainty of Grokster for the industry was remedied by the passage
of the DMCA in 1998.304 For the software industry, MAI and ProCD
represented clear victories. ProCD held that license restrictions on
use were enforceable.305 MAI held that the automatic copying of the
software program by the computer represented copying for purposes of
the Copyright Act (thus requiring authorization by the copyright
holder).306  Although criticized by commentators, this judicial
approach was reaffirmed by the recent Ninth Circuit decision Vernor
v. Autodesk.307 Both questions-(1) does the automatic copying by a
computer constitute copying, and (2) do the provisions of a license
297. The Business Software Alliance (BSA) testified to Congress that the first sale
doctrine should not apply to software. See Extending 'First-Sale' Doctrine to Software Would
Harm Consumers, BSA Testifies, BSA (June 2, 2104), http://www.bsa.org/news-and-
events/news/2014/june/us06022014firstsaletestimony. Similar testimony was given by the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and RIAA. See Mike Masnick, If People Can Sell
Foreign Purchased Content Without Paying Us Again, the US Economy May Collapse, TECHDIRT
(Sept. 20, 2012), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120920/01565420443/mpaa-riaa-if-people-
can-sell-foreign-purchased-content-without-paying-us-again-us-economy-may-collapse.shtml.
298. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
299. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
300. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
301. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
302. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442-56.
303. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 945.
304. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860. In
the pure digital stage of dissemination, the content industry can exercise full control of the
dissemination of its content, allowing for no leakage by the fair use or first sale doctrines. See
infra notes 320-323 and accompanying text.
305. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
306. See MAI, 991 F.2d at 518-19.
307. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir. 2010); Corynne
McSherry, "Magic Words" Trump User Rights: Ninth Circuit Ruling in Vernor v. Autodesk,
ELECTRONINIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept.13, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/09/magic-
words-trump-user-rights-ninth-circuit-ruling.
2014] 81
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
agreement trump copyright doctrine's doctrine of first sale-were
answered by the courts in the copyright holders' favor.
In Sony, a close five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court found
that the VCR manufacturers were not liable for contributory
infringement on the theory that their machine had "substantially
non-infringing uses."308  Specifically, the Court found that time
shifting by consumers to watch television programs was a "fair use."309
The film industry was not happy with this decision. The content
industry responded to their loss in Sony by working on two fronts,
judicial and legislative, to regain control over the dissemination of
their content.310 The software industry led the charge on the former,
and the film, music, and publishing industries on the latter.3 1 1 In the
1980s, the Internet had not become mainstream, but the content
industries understood its potential to dwarf the adverse effects of the
personal recording machines. Anticipating the inevitable transition to
"pure digital," content industries laid the groundwork, judicially and
legislatively, for greater protection over the electronic dissemination of
their content.312 The degree of control achieved was significantly
greater than in the print era, and harkens back to the efforts of the
London booksellers during the eighteenth century to reinstate their
former control over distribution of copyrighted content.313
The content industry developed a strategy to gain greater
control over copyrighted content by convincing Congress that their
interests were coextensive with society's interest in the copyright
system. Beginning in the print era, copyright became increasingly
308. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984). Sony
involved the innovative technology of the 1980s-the videocassette recorder-that allowed
consumers to record television programs for later viewing. See id. at 417. Tapes of these
programs (including films broadcast on television) could be duplicated and distributed. Id. As a
result, the industry wanted the manufacturers to accept controls such that consumers would pay
for their use. See, e.g., Alexis C. Madrigal, The Court Case That Almost Made It Illegal to Tape
TV Shows, ATLANTIC (Jan. 10, 2012, 8:35 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2012/01/the-court-case-that-almost-made-it-illegal-to-tape-tv-shows/251107/;
Eduardo Porter, In a Ruling, The Legacy of Betamax, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/business/in-a-copyright-ruling-the-lingering-legacy-of-the-
betamax.html?pagewanted=all; Retrospective - Betamax and Copyright Infringement, IP IUSTITIA
(July 3, 2013), http://www.ipiustitia.com/2013/07/retrospective-betamax-and-copyright.html.
However, the consumer electronics industry resisted such demands. The result was litigation all
the way to the Supreme Court. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 417. The VCR manufacturers were sued on
the theory of contributory infringement, which rested on direct infringement by consumers. Id.
309. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455.
310. See GILLESPIE, supra note 213, at 168; LITMAN, supra note 146, at 96.
311. Brief for Amicus Curiae Software & Information Industry Ass'n in Support of
Appellant & Reversal, Vernor, 621 F.3d 1102 (No. 09-35969), 2010 WL 894742, at *3; see ProCD,
86 F.3d at 1455; MAI, 991 F.2d. at 518-19.
312. See GILLESPIE, supra note 213, at 175-78; LITMAN, supra note 146, at 96.
313. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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associated with the valuation of copyrighted commodities.314
Copyright industries believed their interest in maximizing the dollar
value of copyrighted commodities defined the goal of the copyright
system. With the rise in fashion of the economic analysis of the law,
scholars began to reflexively assume the connection.315
Content industries, particularly the film industry, had a
legitimate fear of digital commercial piracy. Digital commercial piracy
refers to the reproduction of unauthorized copyright content for sale to
the public (such as unauthorized DVDs).316  Rather than focus
narrowly on those perpetuators, the content industry found it much
more effective (i.e., lucrative) to broaden the scope of their remedy to
reach all unauthorized use, even the type of use sanctioned by Sony.317
Thus, the challenge of technology became an opportunity to eliminate
the leakage from copyright protection posed by the fair use and first
sale doctrines. Content producers were never fans of the first sale
doctrine, as it represented lost revenue. Working with the Clinton
administration in the 1990s, a white paper was commissioned that
ultimately supported industry efforts to amend copyright to regain
control directly over content.318 These recommendations evolved into
the Section 1201 anti-circumvention provisions of the 1998 DMCA. 319
These provisions make the breaking of digital locks on digital content
illegal for any purpose, including fair use, first sale, or to extract the
"ideas" from the "expression."3 20 In the "pure digital" era (content
delivered electronically, i.e., "streaming content"), the positive law
affords no exceptions for fair use or first sale for any purpose,
including learning and education.321
314. See BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 7 (1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.txt.
315. See Jaszi, supra note 23, at 458 n.10.
316. Tunay I. Tunca & Qiong Wu, Fighting Fire with Fire: Commercial Piracy and the
Role of File Sharing in Copyright Protection Policy for Digital Goods, 24 INFO. SYS. RES. 436, 436
(2013).
317. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 13, at 158-59.
318. See LEHMAN, supra note 314.
319. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012).
320. In response to cries from some quarters for a robust fair use exception at least
comparable to print, a small concession was made in granting certain, limited powers to the
Copyright Office. Id.
321. To understand the publishers' actions and how they differ from the pre-digital world
of a physical copy of a hardcover book, it is important to understand how the Section 1201 regime
functions. The Section 1201 regime includes the Section 1201 provisions of the DMCA, as well as
licensing restrictions based in contract and digital rights management echnology to physically
(and legally) lock up the content by the publisher (rights holder). Working together, the Section
1201 regime provides all the tools necessary for the publishers to impose a "pay for use" business
model on libraries (and society). See Tushnet, supra note 30, at 982. The technology offers
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In retrospect, Sony represents the nadir of the fair use doctrine
and the modern pro-restraint movement of copyright. Over twenty-five
years have passed since the Sony decision, and nearly fifteen years
since the DMCA was enacted.322 Fair use has disappeared with
respect to pure digital content (i.e., the electronic dissemination of
content).323  The pro-expansion forces have prevailed in the
distribution function of copyright. Unfortunately, there has been little
attention to the effect of this shift on the knowledge creation process.
All copyright jurisprudence is rooted in a distribution function
analysis of competing content producers' interests.324 The Supreme
Court created the first sale doctrine hailed by the pro-restraint camp
because a reseller, the Macy's corporation, stood up to a publisher,
Bobbs-Merrill, arguing that it had the right to decide the price of the
book it sold.325 Fair use developed from the jurisprudence of Justice
Story over whether a subsequent publisher of George Washington's
biography could include material from another publisher's earlier
publication.326 Judge Hand developed the idea-expression doctrine to
prevent a playwright from claiming that a film producer's work copied
the earlier play.3 27 As discussed earlier, Judge Hand preferred this
publishers the practical ability to begin implementing a more refined fee-based distribution
system for its product, information resources. Just as HarperCollins declared that the library
would no longer have unlimited expiration rights to a digital book, a digital publishing vendor
could begin to offer different price points for digital books based on time or other measures of
use. See Hadro, supra note 13. Publishers have begun to develop the tools and the market power
to distribute digital books mainstream. Blockbuster and Netflix have begun to offer consumers
choices of time restricted viewing, such as a twenty-four hour period, seven day period, or
"purchase" option (meaning indefinite possession not freely transferable). See, e.g., Most
Economical Movie Rental Options for Your Family, CBS BOSTON (Apr. 18, 2011, 7:17 PM),
http://boston.cbslocal.com/2011/04/18/most-economical-movie-rental-options-for-your-family/;
Terms & Conditions, BLOCKBUSTER ON DEMAND, http://www.blockbusternow.com/terms (last
visited Aug. 21, 2013) (discussing time restrictions on viewing in Section 3). Each of these choices
offers the "use" of the film or video at different price points.
322. The Supreme Court decision, Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., was
decided in 1984; the Digital Millennium Copyright Act was passed in 1998. See Pub. L. No. 105-
304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998); 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
323. Since the enactment of the DMCA in 1998, there have been five rulemaking
exemptions granted by the Librarian of Congress (on the recommendation of the Copyright
Registrar). None of the Section 1201 exemptions granted have included electronic disseminated
content (e.g., streamed content). The electronic dissemination of content is referred to herein as
the "pure digital" stage of copyright. There is no fair use or first sale exemptions to Section 1201
for electronic dissemination of content. For the five rulings, see Exemption to Prohibition on
Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg.
65,260 (Oct. 26, 2012) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201); 75 Fed. Reg. 43,825 (July 27, 2010); 71 Fed.
Reg. 68,472 (Nov. 27, 2006); 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011 (Oct. 31, 2003); 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556 (Oct. 27,
2000).
324. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
325. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908).
326. See supra Part II.A.
327. See supra Part III.B.3.
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approach to addressing the messier question of the originality of the
earlier work. To the extent that any of this jurisprudence has
benefited the creation function of copyright, the production of new
works, is conjecture. Courts are not charged with that inquiry, and
Congress has failed to address it.
The next Section analyzes contemporary theoretical models
according to their fidelity to the original objectives of copyright,
namely encouragement of learning and the advancement of
knowledge.328 The conventional copyright models account for access.
However, their proxies for access functioned indeterminately in the
print era, and their function for the digital era is quite dim.3 29 How
would one of the British Lords of 1710 or one of the US constitutional
framers react to the rationales presented for modern day copyright?
The answer to that rhetorical question, as argued in this Article, is




Students, researchers, and especially libraries need rules that
give them ex ante certainty for access to knowledge resources. The
courts have focused on investor value in copyrighted works rather
than copyright's effect on the advancement of knowledge in society.3 3 1
This Section examines the deficiencies of the current models of
copyright in the digital era for advancing copyright's interest in
learning and education. Specifically, it assesses how the educational
and learning needs of three hypothetical individuals, Juan, Sheila and
Frank, would be treated under each model. All three share the lack of
access to traditional sources of information-universities or
corporations. The only knowledge infrastructure institution available
to them is the public library.
328. See Peter Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the Digital
Age, 44 HOuS. L. REV. 1013, 1042 (2007).
329. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
330. How did a limited right of fourteen years for literal infringement of a work, i.e., a
book, expand to a right of one hundred plus years that could be enforced well beyond the literal
copying of the book, to some elastic definition of "substantial similarity"? (Not to speak of their
surprise at seeing films, music, photographs, and software as part of the modern copyright
regime.) See LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT 3 n.7 (2007); Litman, supra
note 2, at 326 (noting that until the late twentieth century, copyright discourse focused on
public's interest in access, citing a 1961 report by the Copyright Registrar).
331. See discussion supra note 219.
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The two dominant camps hold divergent views on the ideal
model for the copyright regime. Neither model addresses the
knowledge principle whereby access to knowledge is a necessary
pre-condition to the creation of new works. The pro-restraint camp
largely relies on the "traditional incentives" approach, which
characterizes copyright as balancing protection for authors to
encourage production with access to the works for the benefit of
society.332 The pro-expansion camp is identified with a "property
rights" approach that eschews the balance paradigm for greater (if not
absolute) protection rights for the copyright holder.333 This model
draws on both natural rights theory and a particular economy theory
known as price discrimination.3 34 The "traditional incentives" model
favors greater access to copyrighted goods for the creative benefit of
consumers (also referred to as "users").335 The "property rights" model
treats access as endogenous to the market function; the market will
allocate copyrighted goods most efficiently.336
The pro-restraint camp has largely focused on the fair use
doctrine to remedy the adverse effects of the expanded protection right
on the public interest of access to copyrighted works. They argue that
a more liberal approach to fair use would expand the public domain of
copyright, benefiting consumers and users.337 There is little inquiry,
however, to the causal processes at work, and more importantly the
more critical question of access to knowledge for learning. The
knowledge creation process is missed altogether.338  Access to
knowledge has been conflated with the concept of consumption of
cultural goods.339  As discussed below, the retrofitting of digital
copyright with the fair use doctrine is not consistent with the
knowledge principle, and thus will not further the interests of
copyright in the advancement of knowledge in society.340 Fair use is a
332. See Robert C. Denicola, Access Controls, Rights Protection, and Circumvention:
Interpreting the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to Preserve Noninfringing Use, 31 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 209, 211-12 (2008); Glynn S. Lunney, Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 578-79 (1996).
333. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
334. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
335. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
336. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
337. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1123-28 (2007);
Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1510-18
(2007).
338. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1997); BOYLE, supra 213; GILLESPIE, supra note
213; HALBERT, supra note 213; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 13; Sunder, supra note 213.
339. See Cohen, supra note 24, at 1179.
340. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
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doctrine that courts have invoked to solve competing interests in the
distribution function of copyright.341  The doctrine is not directly
concerned with the creation function of copyright, and ignores
completely the knowledge principle.342  Access to all works is
necessary for purposes of learning and education; fair use was never
intended to further that purpose.
The pro-expansion camp relies on the idea-expression doctrine
to justify the effects of the Section 1201 regime.343  As long as
copyright protects expression but leaves ideas free for others to use,
creativity will flourish by the creation of new copyrighted works.344 As
discussed below, this argument suffers from serious flaws.34 5 First,
there is the methodological problem of ex post uncertainty. There is
no certainty that a subsequent author is free to use the ideas until a
court has litigated the issue. Second, in the digital era, content
producers are not required to give permission to new authors to access
existing works to "learn" or "use" the ideas of such work.34 6 Third, the
Section 1201 regime does not consider the effect of the market
distribution effects on the knowledge production process. If inequality
continues to grow in access to knowledge resources, society will suffer
the consequences of declining knowledge production. Like fair use
doctrine, idea-expression doctrine is not consistent with the knowledge
principle.347 Judges developed these doctrines to address competing
interests of distributors of copyrighted material, rather than creation
of new knowledge.348
The following Section sketches a new theory to directly address
society's interest in the advancement of knowledge and learning as the
public good of copyright. Public libraries need the ability to make
knowledge resources available for individuals like Frank, Juan, and
Sheila to meet their educational and learning goals. This Article
341. See Jaszi, supra note 23, at 458-59.
342. The knowledge principle requires access to all of the copyrighted work. The fair use
doctrine by definition permits access to only a portion of the work. See Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1985) (finding that directly copying less than 10
percent of the original work was not protected by fair use). A very narrow exception to this
partial use rule is for parody. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1984).
343. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 33, at 14-15.
344. See id.
345. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
346. In print copyright, new authors can access the work at the library without payment.
If they reuse protected expression, the copyright holder must initiate legal action. In digital
copyright, new authors can only access the digital work if the copyright holder gives them
permission ex ante.
347. The knowledge principle requires access to all of the work for purposes of learning
and education. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
348. See Jaszi, supra note 23, at 458-59.
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proposes an alternate model to the conventional copyright theories,
focusing on the critical role that access to knowledge resources plays
in the dynamic processes at work in the production of knowledge and
the creation of new works. In this model, public libraries would
exercise non-waivable "fair access" rights on behalf of the public for
purposes of learning and education.
1. Traditional Incentives Model and the Fair Use Doctrine
Pro-restraint scholars who follow the "traditional incentives"
model refer to the "delicate balance" embodied in copyright law and
policy between protecting the rights of the content producers on the
one hand, and ensuring the access and availability of the works to the
public on the other.349 This sounds like a very appealing proposition;
however, a few points require attention. First, scholars generally
ascribe this maxim to the constitutional underpinnings of copyright.350
They note the "utilitarian" rationale implicit in the language referring
to "limited times" to "promote the progress of Science."351  Their
translation is somewhat loose, as the constitutional clause never
refers to "incentives to produce."352 This is the modern gloss on the
language consistent with the rise of significant copyright industries in
the twentieth century. Second, the term "to produce" is used loosely.
There are two distinct functions associated with copyright: the
creative function and the distribution function.353 Rarely does the
literature focus on this distinction, or more importantly, its doctrinal
and theoretical implications. Third, the second half of the paradigm
associated with "access to copyrighted works" is treated as an abstract
concept rather than a tangible, concrete reality by the traditional
incentives model and its jurisprudence.354 Scholars and jurists have
been satisfied with an abstract model rather than a tested theory.
This protection-access paradigm has been rationalized by
traditional monopoly economic theory. This school of thought
recommends setting the right level of protection at where the
deadweight inefficiencies associated with monopoly power are
349. See Jenny Lynn Sheridan, Does the Rise of Property Rights Theory Defeat
Copyright's First Sale Doctrine?, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 297, 305-06 (2012) and accompanying
citations.
350. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 41, at 1507-08.
351. See, e.g., id.
352. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
353. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
354. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
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minimized.355 Access plays a role in reducing these inefficiencies,
especially to lower-value users.356  Access to copyrighted works
through secondary markets and fair use doctrine reduce these
inefficiencies caused by the monopoly.
The weaknesses of this analysis are at the theoretical and
empirical level. The extent to which the operation of these doctrines,
namely first sale and fair use, have successfully minimized monopoly
inefficiencies has not been tested. Even so, fair use is not sufficient to
meet the needs of society to access knowledge in the knowledge
production process. By its very definition, fair use (as well as the
public domain concept) does not include access to all works-even at
its broadest definition.357
Adherents to the traditional incentives model advocate a more
liberal judicial approach to fair use in order to expand the public
domain of works.358 They believe that this will result in more access
to works, more creativity, and more cultural production.35 9 This claim
is unproven; but more importantly, it misunderstands the heritage of
the doctrine. Judges developed fair use to reverse the early British
rule of an indulgent attitude toward use of existing material in the
production of abridgements.360 These judges never intended fair use
to advance the interests of copyright in learning and education, which
would require access to all copyrighted work.361 The fair use doctrine
is limited by its methodology. Fair use is an ex post standard that is
generally limited to a small portion of the copyrighted material.362
There is no ex ante certainty that a judge would find any portion of a
copyrighted work to be non-infringing.363 Certainty only comes when
355. See William A. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 352 (1989).
356. See id. at 326.
357. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
358. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 175 (2006);
Madison, supra note 205, at 1535 (arguing for a more robust approach to the fair use analysis
than the traditional four-factor test in the context of peer to peer file sharing); Pamela
Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 191.
359. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 65, 1019-22.
360. See discussion supra Part III.A.
361. See discussion supra Part III.A.
362. See Tushnet, supra note 30, at 992, 994. Courts still follow the four-factor test set
out by Justice Story in 1841. Reproduction of the whole amount of the work is generally not
permitted. See id. Parody represents the exception to the partial amount rule. It took a Supreme
Court decision to uphold that limited exception to the exception. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994); Horowitz, supra note 31, at 348-50 ("Though these
'fuzzball factors of fair use' are meant to clarify the meaning of fairness . . . if anything they do
the opposite. . . .").
363. See Horowitz, supra note 31, at 348-50.
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a court finds that the reuse (i.e., after the use has occurred) is
non-infringing under the fair use doctrine.
Another popular concept with the traditional incentives
adherents is that of the "public domain." The copyright statute does
not define public domain law, and there is no consensus on a definition
among scholars.364 The Copyright Office notes that "public domain is
not a place." Further, their definition only refers to works that are no
longer under copyright protection. It does not include portions of
copyrighted works available to the public under the doctrines of fair
use or idea-expression.3 6 5  It is an abstract concept without tangible
means of supporting the interests of learning and education. The
chimera of the public domain lies in its abstractness. Julie Cohen has
noted that public domain is a troublesome concept with a serious
access problem itself.36 6 "The public domain is a metaphor for the
public's dominion, and dominion without access is a very odd sort of
dominion indeed."3 6 7 Public domain is viewed indirectly like a shadow.
In a pure digital era, copyright holders have the legal and technical
ability to lock content so that the public domain treatment of works
becomes less possible.368 The availability of the public domain is
disappearing like a shadow at high noon.369 The public domain is
364. See Cohen, supra note 24, at 1175 ("Surprisingly little scholarly effort has been
devoted to determining where the public domain is. . . . [T]he public domain is a topological
impossibility: a legally constructed space to which everyone is presumed to have access.
Reification of this space enables copyright jurisprudence to avoid coming to grips with the need
for affirmative rights of access to unowned expression within the spaces where people actually
live."); Ann Bartow, Libraries in a Digital and Aggressively Copyrighted World: Retaining Patron
Access Through Changing Technologies, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 821, 824 (2001). At a minimum, it
means unprotected works. Prior to 1976, that definition included works whose term had expired,
works that had not been renewed, or works where formalities had not been met. The 1976 and
1998 copyright statutes extended the copyright term, established a unitary term, and dispensed
with the formalities requirement. These actions by definition decreased the public domain but
empirical evidence is lacking to the magnitude. Some scholars believe that public domain should
include "public domain" treatment of protected works, essentially encompassing not only
unprotected works but also fair use and first sale treatment of protected works. For example, a
book whose copyright has expired would be considered public domain under the minimum
standard. The resale of a copyrighted book after the first sale or the use of excerpts of a
copyrighted book for fair use purposes, such as commentary or teaching, represents "public
domain" treatment of protected works. Even under the minimum definition there would be
consensus that increasing copyright term and abolishing formalities of copyright registration has
served to shrink the public domain (i.e., decreasing number of unprotected works in the public
domain).
365. Definitions, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://www.copyright.govhelp/faq/faq-
definitions.html (last visited July 8, 2014).
366. See Cohen, supra note 24, at 1175.
367. Id.
368. See Digital Rights Management (DRM) & Libraries, AM. LIBR. Ass'N,
http://www.ala.org/advocacy/copyright/digitalrights (last visited July 8, 2014).
369. See Litman, supra note 65, at 993.
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often referred to as the "commons," but in reverse manner to
Blackstone's analogy to real property.3 7 0  If it is challenging to
determine the boundaries of an intangible copyright (compared to the
metes and bounds of a real property space), it is even more
challenging to find the access point to the public domain.
How would fair use work to solve the educational needs of
Frank, Juan, or Sheila, who seek access to learning materials from
their local public libraries? Several problems ensue. For Sheila, her
library does not have a certain digital resource, and they would like to
borrow a copy from another branch. In Frank's case, his library has
the resource, but can only make it available for a few hours because of
budget cuts. This is not sufficient time for Frank to learn the
material. In the print era, public libraries were free to borrow print
materials from other libraries or make copies available without
authorization from the publisher.
Suppose that the public library asks an attorney whether they
can make the materials available under fair use. This would entail
breaking the digital locks and violating the license agreements. The
purpose is only for the learning and education needs of these
individuals. Could the attorney comfortably give them an answer? In
this case, yes, and that answer would be a resounding "no."371 Does
the abstract concept of public domain help them meet the educational
and learning goals of these individuals? Again, the answer is no.
Public libraries attempted to convince the Copyright Registrar that a
special fair use exemption to the DMCA Section 1201 provisions
should be granted to them, but this attempt failed.372
2. Property Rights Model and the Idea-Expression Doctrine
The property rights model for the digital era of copyright is
best described by Paul Goldstein in his treatise, Copyright's Highway:
From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox, first published in 1994.373
Professor Goldstein stated that "[t]he logic of property rights dictates
370. See ROSE, supra note 2, at 88. Blackstone famously called for the "sole and despotic
dominion" of the copyright holder's right over his work to the "total exclusion of the right of any
other individual in the universe." He argued for a common law perpetual right for the copyright
holder. Id.
371. See VAIDHYANTHAN, supra note 13, at 175.
372. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556 (Oct. 27, 2000) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
The Copyright Registrar rejected the request by the American Library Association (in
conjunction with four other major national library associations) for an exception to the "anti-
circumvention" restrictions of Section 1201 of the DMCA. Id. Their final ruling was issued on
October 27, 2000. Id.
373. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 33, at 199-200.
2014] 91
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
their extension into every corner in which people derive enjoyment
and value from literary and artistic works. To stop short of these ends
would deprive producers of the signals of consumer preference that
trigger and direct their investments."374 In this treatise, the copyright
model that Goldstein favored supported maximal control of the
copyrighted work for the rights holder (or the corporate assignee).375
Professor Goldstein's pluralist model relies on consequential and
non-consequential theories as justification for strong property rights:
(1) natural rights; and (2) price discrimination theory, a strand of
economic theory associated with Harold Demetz.376 Why property
rights adherents invoke these rationales may be debated. The
implication for the doctrine, however, has had the effect of
rationalizing the diminishment-if not elimination-of the print era
"limitation" doctrines of fair use and first sale in the digital era of
copyright.377
Adherents of the natural rights theory rationale for promoting
strong protection rights for authors refer to John Locke's seventeenth
century theory of private property.378  Locke's theory on private
property did not directly address intellectual property, but real
property.379 In fact, Locke had lobbied against booksellers' efforts to
renew the Licensing Act in the pre-copyright regime.38 0 As one
commentator has noted, "[m]odern commentators who would venture
so far beyond the boundaries of Locke's thought, into the abstractions
of intellectual property, thus ought to leave his name behind."381 Of
course, invoking such an influential philosopher adds weight to their
argument. Many will not look more closely. It is more likely that
374. Id.
375. See id. In his treatise, he celebrated the potential of the Internet to transform the
dissemination of content through the direct dissemination of digital content to the consumer's
home. See id. at 163. In the early 1990s this was still a "plan" rather than a "reality." In 1994,
Goldstein was concerned that the Sony decision had drawn an invisible line of immunity around
the private home; investment in the infrastructure to realize this transformative potential could
be jeopardized if content owners did not believe they could recoup their investment. See id. at
139. Goldstein suggested the metaphor of the "celestial jukebox" to represent the virtual machine
that would connect a user with digital content. See id. at 21-22.
376. See id. at 141-46. These two bases for the pro-expansion camp have significantly
different philosophical roots. They make similar bedfellows as the Republican Party's social and
fiscal conservatives. Their interests are aligned with respect to certain outcomes.
377. See id. at 216 (calling, in his famous quote, for the extension of rights "into every
corner where consumers derive value from literary and artistic works").
378. See ROSE, supra note 2, at 5; Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude:
Intellectual Property Law 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2239 (2000).
379. See ROSE, supra note 2, at 5.
380. See id. at 32.
381. Tom W. Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in CoPY FIGHTS:
THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1, 3-4 (Adam Thierer &
Clyde Wayne Crews eds., 2002).
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John Locke would support greater access rights than the current
paradigm provides.382
A more accurate spiritual forefather of the natural rights view
of a stronger protection right would be William Blackstone, and his
vigorous defense of a perpetual common law right in literary
property.383 As discussed above, Blackstone's bookseller clients were
attempting to circumvent the effect of the statutory copyright regime
of limited terms enacted in 1710 with the Statute of Anne.3 84
Blackstone's lawyering efforts were briefly successful with the King's
Bench decision of Millar, finding a perpetual common law right of
literary property.385 The House of Lords, however, overturned that
decision in the subsequent case of Donaldson.386
Natural rights theory can coherently justify the creation side of
copyright, as compared to the economic theories, which justify the
distribution function. The problem arises from the assumptions
underlying the theory. If copyright is based on an analogy to real
property, both of those theories implicitly recognize limitations on the
protection right.387 If it is based on Romantic philosophy, however,
there is a justification for granting the sole genius that created
something out of thin air absolute dominion over that creation.388 If it
were only so. If any author had to defend her work as exclusively
independent, with no dependency on any prior work, let alone prove
her genius, there would be very few works meriting such an honor. It
has about as much foundation as the belief that romantic love survives
indefinitely.
Conversely, natural rights theory could be invoked to reduce
the protection right of the putative author. If the named author had
to prove originality in her work similar to the novelty concept in
patent law, she would be vulnerable to assertions that works in the
public domain preceded her work.3 8 9 Paul Goldstein spoke wondrously
382. See id.
383. See ROSE, supra note 2, at 88-89.
384. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.).
385. See Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.).
386. See Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L).
387. See Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1031 (2005).
388. See Jaszi, supra note 23, at 459-60; see also Woodmansee, supra note 214, at 428-
30 (detailing the Romantic conviction that the author-genius was someone who created
something entirely new and unprecedented).
389. See Litman, supra note 65, at 1011-12 ("Were we to take the legal concept of
originality seriously, we would need to ensure that authors' copyrights encompassed only those
aspects of their works that were actually original. We could not draw the boundaries of an
author's property in the contents of her work until we had dissected her authorship process to
pare the preexisting elements from her astigmatic recasting of them. I argued earlier that such a
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of the imagination and creativity in the works Appalachian Spring,
The Sun Also Rises, and Citizen Kane.390  Scholar Mark Rose
humorously rebutted such an assertion of genius and creativity,
noting the debt owed to others was not claimed in the formal
authorship.391 As Jessica Litman put it so well, "[T]he very act of
authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and
recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the
sea."392 Other works influence and inspire creativity. To what extent
any work is novel or original is a matter of degree.
Pro-expansion adherents following the economic model of price
discrimination found early support in Judge Easterbrook's trend
setting opinion, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.393 Price discrimination
theory argues that a monopolist will increase its output beyond the
amount expected in the traditional monopoly model if it can
discriminate between value preferences of users.394  Perfect price
discrimination requires that the producer have perfect information of
the value preferences of all customers and can enforce the price
discrimination.39 5  The most persuasive critique of the price
discrimination model is that even if it works on the drawing board, it
does not work in the real world.3 9 6 Consumers do not have an
dissection would be impossible in practical terms. If it were possible, I am confident that authors
would not welcome it.").
390. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 33, at 61.
391. See Mark Rose, Mothers and Authors: Johnson v. Calvert and the New Children of
Our Imagination, 22 CRITICAL INQUIRY 613, 629, 631 (1996). William Patry discusses this
discrepancy:
Here are a few salient facts about the works in question: (1) Appalachian Spring was
composed by Aaron Copland. The work was a collaboration with ballet great Martha
Graham, who wrote the narrative underpinning of the ballet-the story of a wedding
in rural Pennsylvania. . . . (2) The novel, A Sun Also Rises [sic], written by Ernest
Hemingway, was not only influenced by Hemingway's prior reading of a manuscript
version of F. Scott Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsby, but Fitzgerald, a far more
experienced writer, heavily edited Hemingway's book before publication. (3)
Describing Citizen Kane, Orson Welles' classic motion picture as being created out of
thin air is most shocking of all, given its nature as a roman a clef of the life of William
Randolph Hearst and other figures.
PATRY, supra note 2, at 66.
392. Litman, supra 65, at 966.
393. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (7th Cir. 1996). Judge
Easterbrook waxed poetically about the benefits of price discrimination to encourage a
monopolist copyright producer to increase its production by the opportunity to price differentiate.
Easterbrook enforced a software license agreement that charged a higher price for commercial
use than personal use of the same program. See id.
394. See Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright
Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 869 (1997).




incentive to reveal their true valuations, diminishing the possibility of
maximizing output as promised by the model.39 7
In our current environment, the infrastructure is in place for
producers to practice imperfect price discrimination in the production
and distribution of digital works.398  The promise of the
model-optimal allocation of product-is not possible, even in
theory.399  Imperfect price discrimination will exacerbate wealth
distribution effects. Publishers' only rational choice for distinguishing
price among users will be measurements like time and page use.
Lower value users who might have accessed a work for free at the
public library-or for significantly less through a secondary
market-will find those options disappearing as the digital publication
of works becomes more of a closed "pay for use" access model. While
copyright industries have relied on the promise of perfect price
discrimination to justify the diminishment, if not elimination of first
sale and fair use in digital copyright, the reality of imperfect price
discrimination results in the worst of both worlds.400
The property rights model treats access as either taken care of
by the market or dismissed as not an important value of the system.401
The former approach is generally more consistent with the price
discrimination rationale, and natural rights more consistent with the
latter view. Price discrimination economic theory is transparently
concerned with the distribution function of copyright.402 Its analysis is
on post-creation of the work, and attempts to rationalize more
protection and fewer limitations on the copyright holders' (i.e.,
producer, investor, distributor) ability to exploit the value of the
work.403 The goals of learning and advancement of knowledge are
strikingly absent from both branches of the property rights model.
Doctrinally, the property rights adherents would point to the
idea-expression doctrine as providing sufficient protection for the
circulation of ideas necessary to promote creativity.404 The basic tenet
of the doctrine is that only "expression" is protected, and "ideas" are
397. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood
Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 639 (2007). Why would a wealthy person pay more for a digital
book just because they can afford to? This is the classic problem identified by commentators. See
id. Consumers do not have an incentive to reveal their true price preferences. See id.
398. See id. at 648.
399. See id.
400. See Meurer, supra note 394, at 850-51, 860-61.
401. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 33, at 4-5.
402. See id. at 145-46.
403. See id.
404. See id. at 14-15.
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free to use.4 0 5 Even the greatest legal minds admit that there is no
way to know proactively whether a party's intended "use" is on the
side of angels, an "idea," or the side of devils, an "expression."406
Heralded by the property rights adherents as the most important (if
not only) legitimate limitation on rights holder, it is also
another doctrine rooted in the distribution rubric of copyright. The
idea-expression doctrine is not consistent with the knowledge
principle, which maximizes access to knowledge resources for the
purposes of learning and education, as a pre-condition to the creation
of new knowledge.
What would be the fate of Juan, Sheila, and Frank in the
property rights model? How would the idea-expression doctrine help
them? In the digital copyright model, the content has been protected
by digital locks and licensing restrictions.4 0 7  Only users with
authorization from the content holder can access the "ideas." Content
producers have not been willing to grant special access to public
libraries for purposes of learning and education.408 In their view,
public libraries represent another commercial channel to maximize
the revenue from their copyrighted goods.409 The property rights
model does not consider the market distribution effects of its absolute
protection model. As the digital divide deepens, the knowledge
principle will be further stymied, resulting in a weakening of the
knowledge production system. This creates greater strain on the
fabric of the democratic system as more individuals are left behind.
Mark Rose has stated that copyright is an "institution built on
intellectual quicksand."410 Scholars have noted the flawed doctrinal
categories and incoherency of copyright jurisprudence, but they have
neglected the relationship between the original justification for
copyright encouragement of learning and advancement of
knowledge-and copyright jurisprudence.411 This missing piece has
been access to knowledge, not as a peripheral benefit of the system,
but as a central piece of the healthy functioning of the knowledge
ecosystem and the knowledge infrastructure of society. With an
405. 1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03 (2014).
406. As Judge Hand remarked, "Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary [between
idea and expression], and nobody ever can." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121
(2d Cir. 1930).
407. See Digital Rights Management (DRM) & Libraries, supra note 378.
408. See Stripling et al., supra note 19.
409. See Randall Stross, Publishers vs. Libraries: An E-Book Tug of War, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/20 11/12/25/business/for-libraries-and-publishers-an-e-
book-tug-of- war.html?_r=0.
410. ROSE, supra note 2, at 142.
411. Cf. Jaszi, supra note 23, at 456 ("I analyze the incoherencies of copyright doctrine
from several external perspectives-most notably, modern literary theory.").
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unhealthy ecosystem, the infrastructure weakens, and eventually the
creation and distribution functions will suffer as well.
B. The Future of Copyright
1. Monopolies of Knowledge
This Article contends that favoring the interests associated
with the distribution function, to the point of choking off access to
works of knowledge, will adversely affect the creation of works of
knowledge. The knowledge production function relies upon access
to existing works of knowledge.412  Access to the full work is
required-not merely a part of the work that is indeterminate.
Contemporary copyright has lost sight of the public interest
justification for Anglo-American copyright. The "public interest" has
been reduced to an economic analysis of the monetary value of
copyright commodities, or an abstract discussion of implications of
current copyright doctrine on potential expression.413 This Article
refocuses the public interest on the implications of contemporary
copyright jurisprudence on the same concern that the early British
Lords and the Constitution framers were concerned with-the
"advancement of knowledge" without producing "monopolies of
knowledge. "414
Returning to our original question: how does copyright affect
access to works of knowledge for purposes of creating new knowledge?
Assuming current trends in positive copyright law and financial
support for public libraries continue, unequal access to the knowledge
infrastructure will increase with negative implications for the
knowledge ecosystem, and democratic society generally. Returning to
our three types of individuals with education and learning needs-this
thought experiment assumes some undefined time in the future when
current trends have continued to digitize copyrighted material, and
public libraries have continued to be impacted by the Great
Recession of 2008. Sheila, a high school student living in West
Chicago, is trying to access materials to prepare for college entrance
examinations. Frank, a middle-aged construction worker in
Philadelphia, is attempting to retrain for a new career as a technician
in the telecommunication sector. Juan is an entrepreneur hoping to
learn programming language to design and manage his website.
All three share the lack of access to traditional sources of
412. See discussion supra Part II.A.
413. See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 91, at 211.
414. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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information-universities or corporations. The only knowledge
infrastructure institution available to them is the public library.
Each of them has found it challenging to access the materials
they need in their local public library. Sheila's neighborhood libraries
have closed, and the downtown libraries have limited hours. She
works after school and only has evenings to commute to the library.
She has tried twice, and found the material unavailable, as the library
has limited digital copies available. The more affluent suburbs have
maintained their libraries by raising local funds. Sheila is not a
resident, and cannot access their digital material unless she travels to
their local library and works on their premises. She will still be
limited by the number of hours the library will permit her use. Frank
is fortunate to live in Philadelphia, where he can travel to find a
library with resources. Nevertheless, he has faced significant delays
to his requests for materials because of the limited amount available
and the high demand for the materials. Juan lives in San Jose,
California. His public library has also been affected by shrinking
budgets and available materials. He has been told that local tech
companies occasionally offer free seminars on computer programming.
He is on a waiting list for an Oogleworks seminar.
Starting in the 1990s, public libraries warned that
implementation of the DMCA would result in less copyrighted
material available to those least advantaged in society.415  They
predicted that this would increase the digital divide among income
classes.416 Libraries attempted to counter this shift by compelling
producers to permit more use of the digital works on par with
pre-digital use, but they failed.417 In the print and ink era, the work
was accessible and reproducible. If the copyright holder believed that
unauthorized use constituted infringement, she needed to bring legal
action against the user. This paradigm shift means that the copyright
holder no longer needs to initiate action against an alleged infringer.
In the example of the book, e-books are delivered directly to the user,
wrapped in encryption technology that controls the uses of the book by
the user. The user cannot photocopy a page of the book to use for
traditional "fair use" purposes. Also, the user cannot choose to
transfer the copy of the book to a third party. Content owners
have conflated unauthorized use with infringement.418  Judicial
415. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 33, at 172; Kranich, supra note 74.
416. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 33, at 172; Kranich, supra note 74.
417. See supra notes 321-22 and accompanying text.
418. See Greg Saphier, Copyrights and Voluntary Initiatives, MOTION PICTURE ASs'N AM.
(Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.mpaa.org/copyrights-and-voluntary-initiatives/.
98 [Vol. 17:1:39
KNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE
construction of the DMCA has largely supported the content
producer's position.419
Juan, Sheila, and Frank are at the mercy of the content
producers. Shrinking public budgets have meant that those with
access to information through private and public universities or
corporate resources have become more privileged in society, and those
without those connections become even less privileged. For many
people living in urban and rural environments, the public libraries
will have closed, while others will have reduced hours and fewer
licensed copies of the materials needed by individuals like Sheila,
Frank, or Juan to achieve their educational goals.
How would each of the prevailing copyright schools of thought
respond to Juan, Sheila, or Frank? The "traditional incentives" group
would continue to argue that if digital copyright is amended to insert
an affirmative fair use right for users, then all would be well.
Doctrinally, they would argue that this would logically expand the
public domain, and that would benefit society. Now, what about our
particular individuals' needs?
Assuming for the moment that creating an affirmative fair use
right is politically feasible, it is still unsatisfactory. Fair use fails to
meet the needs of these individuals. They need access to all the
knowledge resources related to their educational objectives. Although
as of 2013, courts have not decreed a defined percentage of material
permissible for fair use, it has been acknowledged that it is not all of
the material.420  It is probably closer to 10-20 percent of the
material.421 More importantly, there is no guaranteed-permissible
amount. A user is subject to challenge by the copyright holder, and
must prepare for expensive litigation. This has already had a chilling
effect on libraries.422 As discussed in Part III, indeterminacy and high
transaction costs marred fair use in the print era. Fair use was not
useful means for education and learning in the print era, and it is not
useful in the digital era of copyright either.
419. See Tushnet, supra note 30, at 1013.
420. See Brief of Appellees at 14-16, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232
(11th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 12-14676, 12-15147), 2013 WL 1790921 (noting that federal district court
found fair use where average length of excerpts university used in its online course material was
10.1 percent of publisher's copyrighted works); see also Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F.
Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012). But see Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445,
463 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("Sometimes it is necessary to copy entire works.").
421. See Brief of Appellees, supra note 420, at 14-16.
422. See Digital Rights Management (DRM) & Libraries, supra note 368; Stripling et al.,
supra note 19.
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Such a proposal is also politically infeasible for one main
reason-legitimate fear of commercial piracy.423 If users had a broad
fair use right-which essentially would mean that reverse engineering
of digital locks on copyrighted material were permissible, subject to
later challenge by the copyright holder-it would be very difficult for
the copyright holder to track the abusers and enforce their lawful
rights.
The property rights groups would have two possible responses,
depending on whether they tended more toward natural rights theory
or economic price discrimination theory. The former's response would
generally be "it's not our problem; we have the rights because they are
based on natural law." If society needs access, society can pay for it.
Distribution should be the responsibility of government-they can pay
for those who cannot afford it.
As discussed above, this argument ignores the collective
nature of original works.424 If a natural rights adherent had to prove
a work's originality and be subject to challenge similar to a patent, the
tables would be turned.425 Suddenly, his or her rights would be
significantly diminished. In addition, many have argued that natural
rights, just like real property, should be subject to qualification or
exception for the public interest.426
For the economic price-discrimination adherent, their response
would be that the market would take care of the access issue. In pure
price discrimination theory, this may be sound. Unfortunately, as
even the price discrimination theorists acknowledge, pure price
discrimination does not occur in the real world.427 Imperfect price
discrimination is actually practiced. Falling back on the similar back
up as natural rights, they would argue it is the government's
responsibility to subsidize use for the less advantaged.
The problem with property rights theorists is that they neglect
the possibility that less access means less learning, which may lead to
less growth in society as a whole. Economists like to argue that their
focus is on the growth of the pie, and it is someone else's job to think
423. See, e.g., Mark Sweney, Game of Thrones Is World's Most Pirated TV Show,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/dec/24/game-of-thrones-
pirated-sky. The MPAA is working with ISPs on voluntary agreements to exclude repeat
violators of alleged copyrights of third parties. See Saphier, supra note 418.
424. See Litman, supra note 65, at 966.
425. See id, at 1011-12.
426. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 33, at 203-04.
427. See Yoo, supra note 397, at 639 ("The absence of any reliable way to determine the
aggregate marginal value that consumers place on a public good makes it all but impossible to
determine the optimal level of production for any public good.").
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about redistribution.428 The implicit assumption is, "do not interfere
with our activity, (i.e., taxes or regulation) because that will interfere
with growth." Presumably, the least advantaged in society should rely
on private charity. Interestingly, economists see the societal
advantage of "public" investment in physical infrastructure, roads,
ports, bridges, and so on.4 2 9 Without the physical infrastructure built
over the twentieth century, the United States would not have been
able to grow into the global commercial powerhouse that it did. The
same need for infrastructure investment exists for the education and
learning of all segments of the population. This need has actually
intensified in the twenty-first century with increased mobility, digital
communication, and reduced workplace security.
There is an acknowledged incoherency in traditional copyright
jurisprudence.430 This Article argues that that this incoherence is
derived from copyright's focus on the distribution function, or the
competing interests of producers of copyrighted materials. Current
doctrine and theory are inadequate to address the constitutional
justification for copyright, namely promoting the advancement of
knowledge. Whether or not incentives theory can ever be proven or
the incoherency of authorship and originality is ever remedied, the
thesis of this Article remains valid.431  Creators need access to
knowledge resources to sustain a healthy knowledge ecosystem.
Content producers will suffer as the damage to the knowledge
ecosystem becomes more pronounced. Less access to knowledge for
428. The normative goal of economic analysis is wealth maximization. See Jules L.
Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 512 (1980);
Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 103
(1979).
429. See NOAH BERGER & PETER FISHER, ECON. ANALYSIS & RESEARCH NETWORK, A
WELL-EDUCATED WORKFORCE Is KEY TO STATE PROSPERITY 1-2 (2013); INT'L MONETARY FUND,
Is It Time for an Infrastructure Push? The Macroeconomic Effects of Public Investment, in WORLD
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: LEGACIES, CLOUDS, UNCERTAINTIES 75, 75 (2014) ("[I]ncreased public
infrastructure investment raises output in both the short and long term .... ").
430. Commentators often refer to the "uncertainty" or "indeterminancy" of copyright
doctrine. If the doctrine were more coherent, outcomes would be more predictable. See LESSIG,
supra note 31, at 185 ("The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely high
penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either never be exercised, or never
be exercised in the open."); David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139,
161-74 (2009); William W. Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659,
1686-92 (1988); Litman, supra note 65, at 975 ("[T]he boundaries of copyright are inevitably
indeterminate."); David Nimmer, "Fairest of Them All" and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 280 (2003) ("Basically, had Congress legislated a dartboard rather
than the particular four fair use factors embodied in the Copyright Act, it appears that the
upshot would be the same.").
431. These include the questions of whether creation is motivated extrinsically by
incentives, or intrinsically by human need, and whether authors should bear the burden of
proving originality.
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learning and education means less knowledge creation, and less
distribution of knowledge. This results in a dysfunctional knowledge
ecosystem, and a fragile knowledge infrastructure. If, however, social
mobility falters, civic participation becomes anemic, economic
productivity falls, the fabric of the democratic state frays.432
The next Section sketches a new framework for the creation
side of copyright that places the access function central to copyright's
role in the knowledge production ecosystem, thus sustaining a healthy
knowledge infrastructure for society. Individuals like Sheila, Frank,
and Juan would have access to the knowledge resources that they
need to meet their educational objectives. Public libraries would have
the right to every copyrighted material, and the ability to provide it to
any citizen-regardless of wealth or status-for the purpose of
learning and education. Citizens' ability to create new knowledge
strengthens, and in so doing, fosters the values of our democratic
society, namely social mobility, economic productivity, and civic
participation.
2. Towards a "Fair Access" Rights Framework
Copyright policy should ensure that all citizens of a democratic
society are able to access the intellectual commons for purposes of
learning and education. This policy would be consistent with the
origins of Anglo-American copyright, and more importantly, support
the present needs of our twenty-first century democratic society. The
"access rights" model adheres to the knowledge principle, and has the
following features and characteristics. First, it recognizes that
individuals must access knowledge (i.e., learn) before they can create
new knowledge. Second, learners and creators, participating in the
knowledge production process, do not distinguish between copyrighted
and non-copyrighted knowledge resources (referred to herein as the
"intellectual commons"). Third, the knowledge production process
applies to all individuals in society, not to any category or class of
persons. Fourth, the contingent, dynamic, and collaborative nature of
the knowledge production process means that the particular spatial
circumstances of the learner and creator are critical to their potential
success as a learner and a creator. Fifth, it assumes that the
copyright distribution right is constant, subject to rights of access for
432. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 58, at 260. More access to information expands
opportunities for participation in social and political life. See Porter, supra note 38; Moises




purposes of learning and education.433 In our hypothetical, the model
would guarantee Sheila, Juan, and Frank the ability to access the
materials they require for their learning needs. If they reused any
portion of those materials to distribute new material, then they would
be subject to existing rules of copyright jurisprudence.
Conventional copyright has been grounded in rationales of
promoting creativity, expression, and production of copyrighted goods
or some combination of thereof.4 3 4  The access rights model is
grounded in the rationale of promoting knowledge in society.435 The
model is not in direct conflict to any of the other theories, and can
operate alongside them-as long as the other theories do not violate
the knowledge principle. The model can be justified under
consequential and non-consequential theories. This model seeks to
foster the ability of the individual to fulfill her potential as a learner
and creator, and in so doing, maximizes social welfare. The spatial
circumstances of the individual learner and creator are the most
significant factors in determining an individual's ability to participate
fully in the knowledge production system. It directly affects the
individual's ability to access the intellectual commons for the purposes
of learning existing knowledge and creating new knowledge.
Julie Cohen has called attention to the literature's lack of
inquiry in the processes involved in the creation of copyrighted
works.436 Professor Cohen's inquiry addresses the broad scope of
cultural production, which represents the whole of copyright subject
matter in contemporary society.437 Cultural production represents not
only works of knowledge, but also works of entertainment, as the
reach of copyright has expanded enormously since its birth.438 The
scope of this inquiry is narrower-it is concerned with a subset of
433. The jurisprudential story examined in Part III explains the development of the
distribution function of copyright from the print era through the digital era, including the
periods of digital transition and pure digital. In the pure digital era, copyright holders enjoy
broad protection rights that are no longer subject o the print era doctrines of fair use and first
sale. Once the digital content is encrypted, end users' limited possession rights of the content are
proscribed by the copyright holder. They cannot sell, give away, or otherwise transfer the digital
book to a third party. They cannot extract a portion of the digital book for reuse, though they
could write it down. Works of knowledge in the digital era are encrypted, and access is far more
limited than in the print era.
434. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
435. This is the Author's thesis and proposed model for copyright.
436. See Cohen, supra note 24, at 1186. Cohen refers to social and cultural theory where
the creative process is seen as a dynamic, collaborative, and contingent process, rather than a
static, transcendent, and absolute one of traditional legal theory. See id. at 1179. She notes that
the latter approach represents legal scholars' myopic tendency to restrict themselves to the lens
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cultural production: knowledge production. The access model follows
Cohen's direction that both processes of knowledge production and
cultural production are not static, transcendent, or absolute, but
rather dynamic, contingent, and collaborative.43 9 Accesses to inputs,
knowledge inputs, and creative inputs drive both processes. Professor
Cohen insightfully noted that "overly broad copyright exacerbates the
structural effects of unequal access to cultural resources by placing
additional obstacles in the path to cultural participation. Narrower
copyright avoids this risk in some cases, and also works in the
opposite direction. In removing obstacles to cultural participation,
narrower copyright broadens and deepens a society's capacity for
cultural progress."440 Similarly, the structural effect of obstacles to
individuals in the knowledge production process significantly impedes
the progress of society-the progress that copyright was intended to
achieve.
In her normative insights, Professor Cohen suggests that
copyright will function better with bright-line rules.441 Applying her
insight to the knowledge production process, a bright-line rule that
benefits education and learning is proposed. This Article proposes a
model that builds on Cohen's work, and focuses on the knowledge
systems sustained by the creation process, or as referred to herein, the
"intellectual commons." Cohen refers to the "artistic and intellectual"
commons as the subset of culture that copyright is concerned with.4 4 2
The intellectual commons represent a subset of Cohen's concept of the
"cultural landscape," concerned with knowledge resources. Cultural
landscape refers to all cultural resources, whether they are
proprietary or public domain, as they are fixed in a spatial context and
available to situated users for creative purposes.
In the ideal model, access to the intellectual commons allows
for the freedom of movement of knowledge resources, and in turn,
positively stimulates the processes of knowledge production,
participation, and transmission that leads to more production of
knowledge resources. The dynamic model works like a feedback loop,
where more access and flow within the intellectual commons leads to a
healthier and more robust intellectual commons. Restrictions on
access and flow impair the knowledge production processes, and
ultimately impair the state and welfare of the intellectual commons
439. See id.
440. Id. at 1198.
441. See id. at 1204. Professor Cohen notes the weak linkage between the public domain
concept and the creative process. See id.
442. Id. at 1153.
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itself. Less restriction on access sustains a virtuous cycle of a robust
knowledge production function and healthy intellectual commons.
Public libraries play a critical role in the access function of the
knowledge production of the intellectual commons. Libraries'
interests are aligned with the collaborative-contingent theory of
knowledge production. Libraries as an institution are best positioned
to sustain the flow and movement of knowledge resources for the
benefit of the intellectual commons. Libraries would circulate the
texts and other materials that contain and incorporate the knowledge
of the commons that need to be circulated to advance the education
and knowledge of society.443  The libraries' mission is to extend
information resources to the public, without regard to status or
income.444 Public libraries serve the values of a democratic society,
and are a critical instrument in the fulfillment of the goals of the
copyright system, namely promoting the advancement of
knowledge.44 5
A possible mechanism for implementing the access model into
copyright policy would be an amendment to Section 108 of the
Copyright Act. The amendment would grant libraries a non-waivable
first-sale right to all copyrighted material, in any form-including
digital content. Public libraries would have the right to acquire any
copyrighted material for their institution either directly from the
content producer, or if the content producer was unwilling to do so,
directly from the Library of Congress. This would serve to expand
access to the intellectual commons through a new "fair access"
doctrine, exercisable by the public library system. Further work needs
to be done to develop the structure of this proposal and to consider
alternative approaches. The amendment must recognize the
publishing industry's concerns that access to digital works could
subsume the private market, as the lines between the two have
blurred with remote access and electronic delivery of digital books.
Throughout the history of the United States, respected leaders
including Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, successful
industrialist-turned-philanthropist Andrew Carnegie, and President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt all acutely understood the critical role of
443. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Library Ass'n, ALA President Barbara Stripling
Unveils 'Declaration for the Right to Libraries' (Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://www.ala.org/
news/press-releases/2013/07/ala-president-barbara-stripling-unveils-declaration-right-libraries;
Open Scholarship, ASs'N RES. LIBR., http://www.arl.org/focus-areas/open-scholarship (last visited
Aug. 21, 2013).
444. See Mission & Priorities, supra note 17; Strategic Plan, supra note 76.
445. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 58, at 266-67. The dissemination of information by
digital access has threatened the ability of public libraries to make information widely available.
See id.
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public libraries in the service of democratic values and a healthy,
productive society.446 Investment in libraries has served our country
well, transforming it from a nineteenth century agrarian society to a
twentieth century industrial society. Now, at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, in the middle of the transformation to an
advanced information society competing with emerging nations like
China, it seems more important than ever to remember the voices
from our past.
V. CONCLUSION
Significant change in copyright policy will not occur until
scholars, as well as thought leaders in both higher education and
public libraries, recognize that the copyright paradigm of the print era
will not address access to knowledge in the digital age. Knowledge
creation requires access to texts in order to educate oneself, as well as
the opportunity to contribute new texts. Authors are readers, and
readers are authors.447 Understanding the misalignment between
copyright's justification and its modern theoretical foundations
requires a closer look at the knowledge production process necessary
for the creation function of copyright. A new paradigm for copyright
theory recognizes the role of public libraries in actualizing access to
texts in order to achieve the public good of copyright-the "progress of
knowledge" and "encouragement of learning."
446. Franklin D. Roosevelt noted that "Libraries are ... essential to the functioning of a
democratic society . . . and the great symbols of the freedom of the mind." SIDNEY H. DITZION,
ARSENALS OF A DEMOCRATIC CULTURE (1947). Thomas Jefferson wrote to a friend, John Wyche,
in 1809, "I have often thought that nothing would do more extensive good at small expense than
the establishment of a small circulating library in every county, to consist of a few well-chosen
books, to be lent to the people of the country under regulations as would secure their safe return
in due time." Vinjamuri, supra note 7.
447. See Cohen, supra note 24, at 1179. Cohen refers to creative process, noting that a
creator must first be a user of artistic and cultural goods before becoming (potentially) a creator.
See id. The tight linkage between copyright and creativity, however, both fuels romantic author
narratives and justifies drawing firm distinctions between authors, on the one hand, and
consumers, imitators, and improvers on the other. See id. Those distinctions dominate the
current landscape of copyright law; they undergird broad rights to control copies, public
renderings, and derivations of copyrighted works and expansive readings of the rules that create
liability for technology infringers. See id.
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